Through this investigation of pediatric vaccine safety, the following findings are made:
1. Mercury is hazardous to humans. Its use in medicinal products is undesirable, unnecessary and should be minimized or eliminated entirely.
2. For decades, ethylmercury was used extensively in medical products ranging from vaccines to topical ointments as preservative and an anti-bacteriological agent.
3. Manufacturers of vaccines and thimerosal, (an ethyl-mercury compound used in vaccines), have never conducted adequate testing on the safety of thimerosal. The FDA has never required manufacturers to conduct adequate safety testing on thimerosal and ethyl-mercury compounds.
4. Studies and papers documenting the hyperallergenicity and toxicity of thimerosal (ethylmercury) have existed for decades.
5. Autism in the United States has grown at epidemic proportions during the last decade. By some estimates the number of autistic children in the United States is growing between 10 and 17 percent per year. The medical community has been unable to determine the underlying cause(s) of this explosive growth.
6. At the same time that the incidence of autism was growing, the number of childhood vaccines containing thimerosal was growing, increasing the amount of ethyl mercury to which infants were exposed threefold.
7. A growing number of scientists and researchers believe that a relationship between the increase in neuro-developmental disorders of autism, attention deficit hyperactive disorder, and speech or language delay, and the increased use of thimerosal in vaccines is plausible and deserves more scrutiny. In 2001, the Institute of Medicine determined that such a relationship is biologically plausible, but that not enough evidence exists to support or reject this hypothesis.
8. The FDA acted too slowly to remove ethylmercury from over-the-counter products like topical ointments and skin creams. Although an advisory committee determined that ethylmercury was unsafe in these products in 1980, a rule requiring its removal was not finalized until 1998.
9. The FDA and the CDC failed in their duty to be vigilant as new vaccines containing thimerosal were approved and added to the immunization schedule. When the Hepatitis B and Haemophilus Influenzae Type b vaccines were added to the recommended schedule of childhood immunizations, the cumulative amount of ethylmercury to which children were exposed nearly tripled.
10. The amount of ethylmercury to which children were exposed through vaccines prior to the 1999 announcement exceeded two safety thresholds established by the Federal government for a closely related substance–methylmercury.
While the Federal Government has established no safety threshold for ethylmercury, experts agree that the methyl mercury guidelines are a good substitute. Federal health officials have conceded that the amount of thimerosal in vaccines exceeded the EPA threshold of 0.1 micrograms per kilogram of bodyweight. In fact, the amount of mercury in one dose of DTaP or Hepatitis B vaccines (25 micrograms each) exceeded this threshold many times over. Federal health officials have not conceded that this amount of thimerosal in vaccines exceeded the FDA’s more relaxed threshold of 0.4 micrograms per kilogram of body weight. In most cases,however, it clearly did.
11. The actions taken by the HHS to remove thimerosal from vaccines in 1999 were not sufficiently aggressive. As a result, thimerosal remained in some vaccines for an additional two years.
12. The CDC’s failure to state a preference for thimerosal- free vaccines in 2000 and again in 2001 was an abdication of their responsibility. As a result, many children received vaccines containing thimerosal when thimerosal-free alternatives were available.
13. The Influenza vaccine appears to be the sole remaining vaccine given to children in the United States on a regular basis that contains thimerosal. Two formulations recommended for children six months of age or older continue to contain trace amounts of thimerosal. Thimerosal should be removed from these vaccines. No amount of mercury is appropriate in any childhood vaccine.
14. The CDC in general and the National Immunization Program in particular are conflicted in their duties to monitor the safety of vaccines, while also charged with the responsibility of purchasing vaccines for resale as well as promoting increased immunization rates.
15. There is inadequate research regarding ethyl-mercury neurotoxicity and nephrotoxicity.
16. There is inadequate research regarding the relationship between autism and the use of mercury-containing vaccines.
17. To date, studies conducted or funded by the CDC that purportedly dispute any correlation between autism and vaccine injury have been of poor design, under-powered, and fatally flawed. The CDC’s rush to support and promote such research is reflective of a philosophical conflict in looking fairly at emerging theories and clinical data related to adverse reactions from vaccinations.
One study that compared the toxicology of ethyl and methyl-mercury was published in 1985 in the Archives of Toxicology, written by researchers from the Toxicology Unit of the Medical Research Council of England. The researchers exposed rats to ethyl and methyl-mercury to “compare total and inorganic mercury concentrations in selected tissues, including the brain, after the daily administration of methyl or ethyl-mercury and to relate these findings to damage in the brain and kidneys.” This study found that both ethyl and methyl-mercury caused damage to the brains and the kidneys. It also found that male and female rats were affected differently: “It has been well documented that one of the first toxic effects of methylmercury in rats is depressed weight gain or even weight loss . . . based on this criteria, ethyl-mercury proved to be more toxic than methylmercury . . . in both sexes . . . the concentration of total mercury (the sum of organic and inorganic mercury) and organic mercury was consistently higher in the blood of ethylmercury-treated rats . . . both alkymercurials damaged the dorsal root ganglia and 9.6 mg Hg/kg/day ethylmercury caused more damage than 8.0 mg Hg/kg/day methylmercury. Ethylmercury was more renotoxic than methyl-mercury . . . tubular dilation was frequently present . . . in kidneys . . . both damage and mercury deposits were more widely spread in ethylmercury-treated rats.”
While there is frequent reference to the paucity of science in understanding the harm that ethyl-mercury can do, there is more understanding in the scientific community than government officials have shared with the Committee.
The mercury amalgams in your mouth, the so-called silver fillings, contain 48 to 50 percent of elemental mercury.
These fillings continuously emit mercury vapor, which will go to the brain and is converted to mercuric mercury . . .
Certain fish contain methylmercury; again, very rapidly taken up from the GI tract, transported quickly to the brain, and converted very slowly to mercuric mercury . . . thimerosal, which again will be taken up by the brain and quickly converted to mercuric mercury–all three forms are neurotoxic.
“By neurotoxic, we mean it will damage nerves and it will damage brain tissues.”
“Let me just say as a final statement that there is no need to have thimerosal in a vaccine.”
In making a presentation to the Institute of Medicine’s Immunization Safety Review Committee, in July 2001, the former Director of the Environmental Toxicology Program at the National Institutes of Health, Dr. George Lucier, proffered the following conclusions:
Ethyl-mercury is a neurotoxin.
Infants may be more susceptible than adults.
Ethyl-mercury should be considered equipotent to methyl-mercury as a developmental neurotoxin. This conclusion is clearly public health protective.
Ethyl-mercury exposure from vaccines (added to dietary exposures to methylmercury) probably caused neurotoxic responses (likely subtle) in some children.
While the debate over whether ethyl or methylmercury is more toxic will probably not be resolved in the near future, a consensus appears to be emerging that exposure to these different types of mercury cannot be considered in isolation.
Rather, witnesses before the Committee stressed that in determining safe levels of mercury exposure, the cumulative level of exposure to all types of mercury must be considered.
Dr. Jeffrey Bradstreet made the following observation at the
July 19, 2002 hearing:
“More concerning to me in the Institute’s treatment of mercury problems, was the almost complete absence of regard for compounding effect of thimerosal on preexisting mercury
levels. The NHANES Study from the CDC had already established that perhaps one in ten children is born to mothers with elevated mercury burden.
The Committee repeatedly heard from government officials that merely exceeding the guideline was not cause for concern. One Merck official, in teaching a Grand Rounds session to staff in November of 1999, postulated that the minimum risk level would need to be multiplied by ten to reach a level at which harm would be expected through exposure. Dr. Roberta McKee of Merck wrote:
“A number of environmental and public health agencies have set a Minimum Risk Level (MRL) for toxic substances. An MRL for ingestion is conceptually equivalent to the Reference Dose of the US Environmental Protection Agency, the Acceptable Daily Intake of the US FDA, and the Tolerable Daily Intake of the WHO. Any exposure to the substance below the MRL is assured to be safe, while exposure to ten times the MRL is assumed to place one at risk of overdose. Exposure at or near the MRL is assumed to be safe but should trigger deliberate and careful review.”
Based on Dr. McKee’s explanation, many babies were exposed to levels of mercury that “placed one at risk of overdose,” and were exposed to amounts well over ten times the EPA’s scientifically validated reference dose. For example, at a recent Committee hearing, Chairman Dan Burton (R-IN) discussed his own family’s experience with vaccine injuries:
“My grandson received vaccines for nine different diseases in one day. He may have been exposed to 62.5 micrograms of mercury in one day through his vaccines. According to his weight, the maximum safe level of mercury he should have been exposed to in one day is 1.5 micrograms, so that is 41 times the amount at which harm can be caused.”
According to the analysis of Dr. McKee, based on the methyl-mercury ingestion guidelines, the Chairman’s grandson would have exceeded the “ten times the MRL” and therefore was placed “at risk of overdose.” In fact, with a 62.5 microgram exposure alone, the EPA, ATSDR, and FDA levels would have been exceeded by 10 times. Because the FDA chose not to recall thimerosal-containing vaccines in 1999, in addition to all of those already injured, 8,000 children a day continued to be placed “at risk for overdose” for at least an additional two years.
It should also be noted that none of the Federal guidelines on mercury exposure have been included specific provisions for safe exposure limits for infants and children. It is widely accepted that infants and young children would be five times more sensitive to the toxic effect of mercury or other neurotoxins than adults. “Exposures early in life are reasonably of greater health concern . . . because of greater brain organ susceptibility.” The FDA has conceded in recent years that many children received doses of ethylmercury through their vaccinations that exceeded the EPA’s minimal risk level for methylmercury.
However, it is also clear that many infants received doses of ethyl-mercury that exceeded the FDA’s higher threshold.
Oh. You mean America is not undergoing a pandemic? On average, abut 8000 people die per day from all causes in the United States. In the first 8 months of 2020 there were only ~1200 excess deaths per month or 40 extra deaths per day exclusively due to COVID-19 coronavirus infections, with 80% of those among American age 65 and older. By extrapolation, there were only ~8 excess COVID-19 only deaths per day among working-age adults and school-age children.
Translation: of the 161,392 accumulated COVID-19 RELATED deaths reported as of August 22, 2020 (80% being among Americans age 75 and older), only 6% or ~9683 accumulated deaths were classified as COVID-19 only. Among these COVID-19 only deaths, ~60% were age 75 and older; 80% were age 65 and older. So, there were only ~2000 COVID-only deaths in working age adults and school-age children.
Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1 . Policy. Advances in digital and distributed ledger technology for financial services have led to dramatic growth in markets for digital assets, with profound implications for the protection of consumers, investors, and businesses, including data privacy and security; financial stability and systemic risk; crime; national security; the ability to exercise human rights; financial inclusion and equity; and energy demand and climate change. In November 2021, non-state issued digital assets reached a combined market capitalization of $3 trillion, up from approximately $14 billion in early November 2016. Monetary authorities globally are also exploring, and in some cases introducing, central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).
While many activities involving digital assets are within the scope of existing domestic laws and regulations, an area where the United States has been a global leader, growing development and adoption of digital assets and related innovations, as well as inconsistent controls to defend against certain key risks, necessitate an evolution and alignment of the United States Government approach to digital assets. The United States has an interest in responsible financial innovation, expanding access to safe and affordable financial services, and reducing the cost of domestic and cross-border funds transfers and payments, including through the continued modernization of public payment systems. We must take strong steps to reduce the risks that digital assets could pose to consumers, investors, and business protections; financial stability and financial system integrity; combating and preventing crime and illicit finance; national security; the ability to exercise human rights; financial inclusion and equity; and climate change and pollution.
Sec. 2 . Objectives. The principal policy objectives of the United States with respect to digital assets are as follows:
(a) We must protect consumers, investors, and businesses in the United States. The unique and varied features of digital assets can pose significant financial risks to consumers, investors, and businesses if appropriate protections are not in place. In the absence of sufficient oversight and standards, firms providing digital asset services may provide inadequate protections for sensitive financial data, custodial and other arrangements relating to customer assets and funds, or disclosures of risks associated with investment. Cybersecurity and market failures at major digital asset exchanges and trading platforms have resulted in billions of dollars in losses. The United States should ensure that safeguards are in place and promote the responsible development of digital assets to protect consumers, investors, and businesses; maintain privacy; and shield against arbitrary or unlawful surveillance, which can contribute to human rights abuses.
(b) We must protect United States and global financial stability and mitigate systemic risk. Some digital asset trading platforms and service providers have grown rapidly in size and complexity and may not be subject to or in compliance with appropriate regulations or supervision. Digital asset issuers, exchanges and trading platforms, and intermediaries whose activities may increase risks to financial stability, should, as appropriate, be subject to and in compliance with regulatory and supervisory standards that govern traditional market infrastructures and financial firms, in line with the general Start Printed Page 14144 principle of “same business, same risks, same rules.” The new and unique uses and functions that digital assets can facilitate may create additional economic and financial risks requiring an evolution to a regulatory approach that adequately addresses those risks.
(c) We must mitigate the illicit finance and national security risks posed by misuse of digital assets. Digital assets may pose significant illicit finance risks, including money laundering, cybercrime and ransomware, narcotics and human trafficking, and terrorism and proliferation financing. Digital assets may also be used as a tool to circumvent United States and foreign financial sanctions regimes and other tools and authorities. Further, while the United States has been a leader in setting international standards for the regulation and supervision of digital assets for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), poor or nonexistent implementation of those standards in some jurisdictions abroad can present significant illicit financing risks for the United States and global financial systems. Illicit actors, including the perpetrators of ransomware incidents and other cybercrime, often launder and cash out of their illicit proceeds using digital asset service providers in jurisdictions that have not yet effectively implemented the international standards set by the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The continued availability of service providers in jurisdictions where international AML/CFT standards are not effectively implemented enables financial activity without illicit finance controls. Growth in decentralized financial ecosystems, peer-to-peer payment activity, and obscured blockchain ledgers without controls to mitigate illicit finance could also present additional market and national security risks in the future. The United States must ensure appropriate controls and accountability for current and future digital assets systems to promote high standards for transparency, privacy, and security—including through regulatory, governance, and technological measures—that counter illicit activities and preserve or enhance the efficacy of our national security tools. When digital assets are abused or used in illicit ways, or undermine national security, it is in the national interest to take actions to mitigate these illicit finance and national security risks through regulation, oversight, law enforcement action, or use of other United States Government authorities.
(d) We must reinforce United States leadership in the global financial system and in technological and economic competitiveness, including through the responsible development of payment innovations and digital assets. The United States has an interest in ensuring that it remains at the forefront of responsible development and design of digital assets and the technology that underpins new forms of payments and capital flows in the international financial system, particularly in setting standards that promote: democratic values; the rule of law; privacy; the protection of consumers, investors, and businesses; and interoperability with digital platforms, legacy architecture, and international payment systems. The United States derives significant economic and national security benefits from the central role that the United States dollar and United States financial institutions and markets play in the global financial system. Continued United States leadership in the global financial system will sustain United States financial power and promote United States economic interests.
(e) We must promote access to safe and affordable financial services. Many Americans are underbanked and the costs of cross-border money transfers and payments are high. The United States has a strong interest in promoting responsible innovation that expands equitable access to financial services, particularly for those Americans underserved by the traditional banking system, including by making investments and domestic and cross-border funds transfers and payments cheaper, faster, and safer, and by promoting greater and more cost-efficient access to financial products and services. The United States also has an interest in ensuring that the benefits of financial innovation are enjoyed equitably by all Americans and that any disparate impacts of financial innovation are mitigated. Start Printed Page 14145
(f) We must support technological advances that promote responsible development and use of digital assets. The technological architecture of different digital assets has substantial implications for privacy, national security, the operational security and resilience of financial systems, climate change, the ability to exercise human rights, and other national goals. The United States has an interest in ensuring that digital asset technologies and the digital payments ecosystem are developed, designed, and implemented in a responsible manner that includes privacy and security in their architecture, integrates features and controls that defend against illicit exploitation, and reduces negative climate impacts and environmental pollution, as may result from some cryptocurrency mining.
Sec. 3 . Coordination. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (APEP) shall coordinate, through the interagency process described in National Security Memorandum 2 of February 4, 2021 (Renewing the National Security Council System), the executive branch actions necessary to implement this order. The interagency process shall include, as appropriate: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Domestic Policy Council, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development. Representatives of other executive departments and agencies (agencies) and other senior officials may be invited to attend interagency meetings as appropriate, including, with due respect for their regulatory independence, representatives of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and other Federal regulatory agencies.
Sec. 4 . Policy and Actions Related to United States Central Bank Digital Currencies. (a) The policy of my Administration on a United States CBDC is as follows:
(i) Sovereign money is at the core of a well-functioning financial system, macroeconomic stabilization policies, and economic growth. My Administration places the highest urgency on research and development efforts into the potential design and deployment options of a United States CBDC. These efforts should include assessments of possible benefits and risks for consumers, investors, and businesses; financial stability and systemic risk; payment systems; national security; the ability to exercise human rights; financial inclusion and equity; and the actions required to launch a United States CBDC if doing so is deemed to be in the national interest.
(ii) My Administration sees merit in showcasing United States leadership and participation in international fora related to CBDCs and in multi-country conversations and pilot projects involving CBDCs. Any future dollar payment system should be designed in a way that is consistent with United States priorities (as outlined in section 4(a)(i) of this order) and democratic values, including privacy protections, and that ensures the global financial system has appropriate transparency, connectivity, and platform and architecture interoperability or transferability, as appropriate.
(iii) A United States CBDC may have the potential to support efficient and low-cost transactions, particularly for cross-border funds transfers and payments, and to foster greater access to the financial system, with fewer of the risks posed by private sector-administered digital assets. A United States CBDC that is interoperable with CBDCs issued by other monetary Start Printed Page 14146 authorities could facilitate faster and lower-cost cross-border payments and potentially boost economic growth, support the continued centrality of the United States within the international financial system, and help to protect the unique role that the dollar plays in global finance. There are also, however, potential risks and downsides to consider. We should prioritize timely assessments of potential benefits and risks under various designs to ensure that the United States remains a leader in the international financial system.
(b) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit to the President a report on the future of money and payment systems, including the conditions that drive broad adoption of digital assets; the extent to which technological innovation may influence these outcomes; and the implications for the United States financial system, the modernization of and changes to payment systems, economic growth, financial inclusion, and national security. This report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. Based on the potential United States CBDC design options, this report shall include an analysis of:
(i) the potential implications of a United States CBDC, based on the possible design choices, for national interests, including implications for economic growth and stability;
(ii) the potential implications a United States CBDC might have on financial inclusion;
(iii) the potential relationship between a CBDC and private sector-administered digital assets;
(iv) the future of sovereign and privately produced money globally and implications for our financial system and democracy;
(v) the extent to which foreign CBDCs could displace existing currencies and alter the payment system in ways that could undermine United States financial centrality;
(vi) the potential implications for national security and financial crime, including an analysis of illicit financing risks, sanctions risks, other law enforcement and national security interests, and implications for human rights; and
(vii) an assessment of the effects that the growth of foreign CBDCs may have on United States interests generally.
(c) The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Chairman of the Federal Reserve) is encouraged to continue to research and report on the extent to which CBDCs could improve the efficiency and reduce the costs of existing and future payments systems, to continue to assess the optimal form of a United States CBDC, and to develop a strategic plan for Federal Reserve and broader United States Government action, as appropriate, that evaluates the necessary steps and requirements for the potential implementation and launch of a United States CBDC. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve is also encouraged to evaluate the extent to which a United States CBDC, based on the potential design options, could enhance or impede the ability of monetary policy to function effectively as a critical macroeconomic stabilization tool.
(d) The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, shall:
(i) within 180 days of the date of this order, provide to the President through the APNSA and APEP an assessment of whether legislative changes would be necessary to issue a United States CBDC, should it be deemed appropriate and in the national interest; and Start Printed Page 14147
(ii) within 210 days of the date of this order, provide to the President through the APNSA and the APEP a corresponding legislative proposal, based on consideration of the report submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury under section 4(b) of this order and any materials developed by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve consistent with section 4(c) of this order.
Sec. 5 . Measures to Protect Consumers, Investors, and Businesses. (a) The increased use of digital assets and digital asset exchanges and trading platforms may increase the risks of crimes such as fraud and theft, other statutory and regulatory violations, privacy and data breaches, unfair and abusive acts or practices, and other cyber incidents faced by consumers, investors, and businesses. The rise in use of digital assets, and differences across communities, may also present disparate financial risk to less informed market participants or exacerbate inequities. It is critical to ensure that digital assets do not pose undue risks to consumers, investors, or businesses, and to put in place protections as a part of efforts to expand access to safe and affordable financial services.
(b) Consistent with the goals stated in section 5(a) of this order:
(i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor and the heads of other relevant agencies, including, as appropriate, the heads of independent regulatory agencies such as the FTC, the SEC, the CFTC, Federal banking agencies, and the CFPB, shall submit to the President a report, or section of the report required by section 4 of this order, on the implications of developments and adoption of digital assets and changes in financial market and payment system infrastructures for United States consumers, investors, businesses, and for equitable economic growth. One section of the report shall address the conditions that would drive mass adoption of different types of digital assets and the risks and opportunities such growth might present to United States consumers, investors, and businesses, including a focus on how technological innovation may impact these efforts and with an eye toward those most vulnerable to disparate impacts. The report shall also include policy recommendations, including potential regulatory and legislative actions, as appropriate, to protect United States consumers, investors, and businesses, and support expanding access to safe and affordable financial services. The report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(ii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Chief Technology Officer of the United States, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit to the President a technical evaluation of the technological infrastructure, capacity, and expertise that would be necessary at relevant agencies to facilitate and support the introduction of a CBDC system should one be proposed. The evaluation should specifically address the technical risks of the various designs, including with respect to emerging and future technological developments, such as quantum computing. The evaluation should also include any reflections or recommendations on how the inclusion of digital assets in Federal processes may affect the work of the United States Government and the provision of Government services, including risks and benefits to cybersecurity, customer experience, and social-safety-net programs. The evaluation shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(iii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the President a report on the role of law enforcement agencies in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting criminal activity related to digital assets. The report shall include any recommendations on regulatory or legislative actions, as appropriate. Start Printed Page 14148
(iv) The Attorney General, the Chair of the FTC, and the Director of the CFPB are each encouraged to consider what, if any, effects the growth of digital assets could have on competition policy.
(v) The Chair of the FTC and the Director of the CFPB are each encouraged to consider the extent to which privacy or consumer protection measures within their respective jurisdictions may be used to protect users of digital assets and whether additional measures may be needed.
(vi) The Chair of the SEC, the Chairman of the CFTC, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency are each encouraged to consider the extent to which investor and market protection measures within their respective jurisdictions may be used to address the risks of digital assets and whether additional measures may be needed.
(vii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Assistant to the President and National Climate Advisor, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit a report to the President on the connections between distributed ledger technology and short-, medium-, and long-term economic and energy transitions; the potential for these technologies to impede or advance efforts to tackle climate change at home and abroad; and the impacts these technologies have on the environment. This report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. The report should also address the effect of cryptocurrencies’ consensus mechanisms on energy usage, including research into potential mitigating measures and alternative mechanisms of consensus and the design tradeoffs those may entail. The report should specifically address:
(A) potential uses of blockchain that could support monitoring or mitigating technologies to climate impacts, such as exchanging of liabilities for greenhouse gas emissions, water, and other natural or environmental assets; and
(B) implications for energy policy, including as it relates to grid management and reliability, energy efficiency incentives and standards, and sources of energy supply.
(viii) Within 1 year of submission of the report described in section 5(b)(vii) of this order, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall update the report described in section 5(b)(vii) of this order, including to address any knowledge gaps identified in such report.
Sec. 6 . Actions to Promote Financial Stability, Mitigate Systemic Risk, and Strengthen Market Integrity. (a) Financial regulators—including the SEC, the CFTC, and the CFPB and Federal banking agencies—play critical roles in establishing and overseeing protections across the financial system that safeguard its integrity and promote its stability. Since 2017, the Secretary of the Treasury has convened the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to assess the financial stability risks and regulatory gaps posed by the ongoing adoption of digital assets. The United States must assess and take steps to address risks that digital assets pose to financial stability and financial market integrity.
(b) Within 210 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury should convene the FSOC and produce a report outlining the specific financial stability risks and regulatory gaps posed by various types of digital assets and providing recommendations to address such risks. As the Secretary Start Printed Page 14149 of the Treasury and the FSOC deem appropriate, the report should consider the particular features of various types of digital assets and include recommendations that address the identified financial stability risks posed by these digital assets, including any proposals for additional or adjusted regulation and supervision as well as for new legislation. The report should take account of the prior analyses and assessments of the FSOC, agencies, and the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, including the ongoing work of the Federal banking agencies, as appropriate.
Sec. 7 . Actions to Limit Illicit Finance and Associated National Security Risks. (a) Digital assets have facilitated sophisticated cybercrime-related financial networks and activity, including through ransomware activity. The growing use of digital assets in financial activity heightens risks of crimes such as money laundering, terrorist and proliferation financing, fraud and theft schemes, and corruption. These illicit activities highlight the need for ongoing scrutiny of the use of digital assets, the extent to which technological innovation may impact such activities, and exploration of opportunities to mitigate these risks through regulation, supervision, public-private engagement, oversight, and law enforcement.
(b) Within 90 days of submission to the Congress of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies may each submit to the President supplemental annexes, which may be classified or unclassified, to the Strategy offering additional views on illicit finance risks posed by digital assets, including cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and trends in the use of digital assets by illicit actors.
(c) Within 120 days of submission to the Congress of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies shall develop a coordinated action plan based on the Strategy’s conclusions for mitigating the digital-asset-related illicit finance and national security risks addressed in the updated strategy. This action plan shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. The action plan shall address the role of law enforcement and measures to increase financial services providers’ compliance with AML/CFT obligations related to digital asset activities.
(d) Within 120 days following completion of all of the following reports—the National Money Laundering Risk Assessment; the National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment; the National Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment; and the updated National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing—the Secretary of the Treasury shall notify the relevant agencies through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order on any pending, proposed, or prospective rulemakings to address digital asset illicit finance risks. The Secretary of the Treasury shall consult with and consider the perspectives of relevant agencies in evaluating opportunities to mitigate such risks through regulation.
Sec. 8 . Policy and Actions Related to Fostering International Cooperation and United States Competitiveness. (a) The policy of my Administration on fostering international cooperation and United States competitiveness with respect to digital assets and financial innovation is as follows:
(i) Technology-driven financial innovation is frequently cross-border and therefore requires international cooperation among public authorities. This cooperation is critical to maintaining high regulatory standards and a level playing field. Uneven regulation, supervision, and compliance across jurisdictions creates opportunities for arbitrage and raises risks to financial Start Printed Page 14150 stability and the protection of consumers, investors, businesses, and markets. Inadequate AML/CFT regulation, supervision, and enforcement by other countries challenges the ability of the United States to investigate illicit digital asset transaction flows that frequently jump overseas, as is often the case in ransomware payments and other cybercrime-related money laundering. There must also be cooperation to reduce inefficiencies in international funds transfer and payment systems.
(ii) The United States Government has been active in international fora and through bilateral partnerships on many of these issues and has a robust agenda to continue this work in the coming years. While the United States held the position of President of the FATF, the United States led the group in developing and adopting the first international standards on digital assets. The United States must continue to work with international partners on standards for the development and appropriate interoperability of digital payment architectures and CBDCs to reduce payment inefficiencies and ensure that any new funds transfer and payment systems are consistent with United States values and legal requirements.
(iii) While the United States held the position of President of the 2020 G7, the United States established the G7 Digital Payments Experts Group to discuss CBDCs, stablecoins, and other digital payment issues. The G7 report outlining a set of policy principles for CBDCs is an important contribution to establishing guidelines for jurisdictions for the exploration and potential development of CBDCs. While a CBDC would be issued by a country’s central bank, the supporting infrastructure could involve both public and private participants. The G7 report highlighted that any CBDC should be grounded in the G7’s long-standing public commitments to transparency, the rule of law, and sound economic governance, as well as the promotion of competition and innovation.
(iv) The United States continues to support the G20 roadmap for addressing challenges and frictions with cross-border funds transfers and payments for which work is underway, including work on improvements to existing systems for cross-border funds transfers and payments, the international dimensions of CBDC designs, and the potential of well-regulated stablecoin arrangements. The international Financial Stability Board (FSB), together with standard-setting bodies, is leading work on issues related to stablecoins, cross-border funds transfers and payments, and other international dimensions of digital assets and payments, while FATF continues its leadership in setting AML/CFT standards for digital assets. Such international work should continue to address the full spectrum of issues and challenges raised by digital assets, including financial stability, consumer, investor, and business risks, and money laundering, terrorist financing, proliferation financing, sanctions evasion, and other illicit activities.
(v) My Administration will elevate the importance of these topics and expand engagement with our critical international partners, including through fora such as the G7, G20, FATF, and FSB. My Administration will support the ongoing international work and, where appropriate, push for additional work to drive development and implementation of holistic standards, cooperation and coordination, and information sharing. With respect to digital assets, my Administration will seek to ensure that our core democratic values are respected; consumers, investors, and businesses are protected; appropriate global financial system connectivity and platform and architecture interoperability are preserved; and the safety and soundness of the global financial system and international monetary system are maintained.
(b) In furtherance of the policy stated in section 8(a) of this order:
(i) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall establish a framework for interagency international engagement with foreign counterparts and Start Printed Page 14151 in international fora to, as appropriate, adapt, update, and enhance adoption of global principles and standards for how digital assets are used and transacted, and to promote development of digital asset and CBDC technologies consistent with our values and legal requirements. This framework shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. This framework shall include specific and prioritized lines of effort and coordinated messaging; interagency engagement and activities with foreign partners, such as foreign assistance and capacity-building efforts and coordination of global compliance; and whole-of-government efforts to promote international principles, standards, and best practices. This framework should reflect ongoing leadership by the Secretary of the Treasury and financial regulators in relevant international financial standards bodies, and should elevate United States engagement on digital assets issues in technical standards bodies and other international fora to promote development of digital asset and CBDC technologies consistent with our values.
(ii) Within 1 year of the date of the establishment of the framework required by section 8(b)(i) of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other relevant agencies as appropriate, shall submit a report to the President on priority actions taken under the framework and its effectiveness. This report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(iii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall establish a framework for enhancing United States economic competitiveness in, and leveraging of, digital asset technologies. This framework shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(iv) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit a report to the President on how to strengthen international law enforcement cooperation for detecting, investigating, and prosecuting criminal activity related to digital assets.
Sec. 9 . Definitions. For the purposes of this order:
(a) The term “blockchain” refers to distributed ledger technologies where data is shared across a network that creates a digital ledger of verified transactions or information among network participants and the data are typically linked using cryptography to maintain the integrity of the ledger and execute other functions, including transfer of ownership or value.
(b) The term “central bank digital currency” or “CBDC” refers to a form of digital money or monetary value, denominated in the national unit of account, that is a direct liability of the central bank.
(c) The term “cryptocurrencies” refers to a digital asset, which may be a medium of exchange, for which generation or ownership records are supported through a distributed ledger technology that relies on cryptography, such as a blockchain.
(d) The term “digital assets” refers to all CBDCs, regardless of the technology used, and to other representations of value, financial assets and instruments, or claims that are used to make payments or investments, or to transmit or exchange funds or the equivalent thereof, that are issued or represented in digital form through the use of distributed ledger technology. For example, digital assets include cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and CBDCs. Regardless of the label used, a digital asset may be, among other things, a security, a commodity, a derivative, or other financial product. Start Printed Page 14152 Digital assets may be exchanged across digital asset trading platforms, including centralized and decentralized finance platforms, or through peer-to-peer technologies.
(e) The term “stablecoins” refers to a category of cryptocurrencies with mechanisms that are aimed at maintaining a stable value, such as by pegging the value of the coin to a specific currency, asset, or pool of assets or by algorithmically controlling supply in response to changes in demand in order to stabilize value.
Sec. 10 . General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
THE WHITE HOUSE, March 9, 2022. Filed 3-11-22; 8:45 am]
Sec. 4 . Policy and Actions Related to United States Central Bank Digital Currencies. (a) The policy of my Administration on a United States CBDC is as follows:
(i) Sovereign money is at the core of a well-functioning financial system, macroeconomic stabilization policies, and economic growth. My Administration places the highest urgency on research and development efforts into the potential design and deployment options of a United States CBDC. These efforts should include assessments of possible benefits and risks for consumers, investors, and businesses; financial stability and systemic risk; payment systems; national security; the ability to exercise human rights; financial inclusion and equity; and the actions required to launch a United States CBDC if doing so is deemed to be in the national interest.
(ii) My Administration sees merit in showcasing United States leadership and participation in international fora related to CBDCs and in multi-country conversations and pilot projects involving CBDCs. Any future dollar payment system should be designed in a way that is consistent with United States priorities (as outlined in section 4(a)(i) of this order) and democratic values, including privacy protections, and that ensures the global financial system has appropriate transparency, connectivity, and platform and architecture interoperability or transferability, as appropriate.
(iii) A United States CBDC may have the potential to support efficient and low-cost transactions, particularly for cross-border funds transfers and payments, and to foster greater access to the financial system, with fewer of the risks posed by private sector-administered digital assets. A United States CBDC that is interoperable with CBDCs issued by other monetary authorities could facilitate faster and lower-cost cross-border payments and potentially boost economic growth, support the continued centrality of the United States within the international financial system, and help to protect the unique role that the dollar plays in global finance. There are also, however, potential risks and downsides to consider. We should prioritize timely assessments of potential benefits and risks under various designs to ensure that the United States remains a leader in the international financial system.
(b) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit to the President a report on the future of money and payment systems, including the conditions that drive broad adoption of digital assets; the extent to which technological innovation may influence these outcomes; and the implications for the United States financial system, the modernization of and changes to payment systems, economic growth, financial inclusion, and national security. This report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. Based on the potential United States CBDC design options, this report shall include an analysis of:
(i) the potential implications of a United States CBDC, based on the possible design choices, for national interests, including implications for economic growth and stability;
(ii) the potential implications a United States CBDC might have on financial inclusion;
(iii) the potential relationship between a CBDC and private sector-administered digital assets;
(iv) the future of sovereign and privately produced money globally and implications for our financial system and democracy;
(v) the extent to which foreign CBDCs could displace existing currencies and alter the payment system in ways that could undermine United States financial centrality;
(vi) the potential implications for national security and financial crime, including an analysis of illicit financing risks, sanctions risks, other law enforcement and national security interests, and implications for human rights; and
(vii) an assessment of the effects that the growth of foreign CBDCs may have on United States interests generally.
(c) The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Chairman of the Federal Reserve) is encouraged to continue to research and report on the extent to which CBDCs could improve the efficiency and reduce the costs of existing and future payments systems, to continue to assess the optimal form of a United States CBDC, and to develop a strategic plan for Federal Reserve and broader United States Government action, as appropriate, that evaluates the necessary steps and requirements for the potential implementation and launch of a United States CBDC. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve is also encouraged to evaluate the extent to which a United States CBDC, based on the potential design options, could enhance or impede the ability of monetary policy to function effectively as a critical macroeconomic stabilization tool.
(d) The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, shall:
(i) within 180 days of the date of this order, provide to the President through the APNSA and APEP an assessment of whether legislative changes would be necessary to issue a United States CBDC, should it be deemed appropriate and in the national interest; and
(ii) within 210 days of the date of this order, provide to the President through the APNSA and the APEP a corresponding legislative proposal, based on consideration of the report submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury under section 4(b) of this order and any materials developed by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve consistent with section 4(c) of this order.
The language in Section 4 makes Order 14067…
…the most treacherous act by a sitting President in the history of our republic.
Because Section 4 sets the stage for…
Legal government surveillance of all US citizens…
Total control over your bank accounts and purchases…
And the ability to silence all dissenting voices for good.
In this new war on freedom, the Dems aren’t coming for your guns.
No, they’re thinking much bigger than that…
They’re coming for your money.
And it’s already started.
Former Advisor to Pentagon and CIA: “Your life savings and freedoms are at immediate risk.“
Jim Richards, a former advisor to the Pentagon, the White House, Congress, the CIA, and the Department of Defense and an attorney, investment banker……and author of 7 books on currencies and international economics has stated the following…
When places like Fox, CNBC or Bloomberg want to know what’s about to shakeup the global economy, they call me.
Most of all, like you, I’m a proud American patriot.
The disturbing predictions you’re about to see are based on my independent research and my contacts in the intelligence community.
Someone needs to pull the alarm!
Section 4 of Biden’s Order means for all Americans…it is laying the groundwork for…
The US dollar being made obsolete.
It Can Happen Here: The Confiscation Scheme Planned for US and UK Depositors
Confiscating the customer deposits in Cyprus banks, it seems, was not a one-off, desperate idea of a few eurozone troika officials scrambling to salvage their balance sheets. A joint paper by the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Bank of England dated December 10, 2012, shows that these plans have been long in the making; that they originated with the G20 Financial Stability Board in Basel, Switzerland (discussed earlier here); and that the result will be to deliver clear title to the banks of depositor funds. New Zealand has a similar directive, discussed earlier here.
Few depositors realize that legally, the bank owns the depositor’s funds as soon as they are put in the bank. Our money becomes the bank’s, and we become unsecured creditors holding IOUs. (See here and here.) But until now, the bank has been obligated to pay the money back as cash on demand. Under the FDIC-BOE plan, our IOUs will be converted into “bank equity.” The bank will get the money and we will get stock in the bank. With any luck we may be able to sell the stock to someone else, but when and at what price? Most people keep a deposit account so they can have ready cash to pay the bills.
Reading the Fine Print
The 15-page FDIC-BOE document is called “Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions.” It begins by explaining that since the 2008 banking crisis, it has become clear that some other way besides taxpayer bailouts are needed to maintain “financial stability.” Evidently anticipating that the next financial collapse will be on a grander scale than either the taxpayers or Congress is willing to underwrite, the authors present this alternative:
An efficient path for returning the sound operations of the G-SIFI to the private sector would be provided by exchanging or converting a sufficient amount of the unsecured debt from the original creditors of the failed company [meaning the depositors] into equity [or stock]. In the U.S., the new equity would become capital in one or more newly formed operating entities. In the U.K., the same approach could be used, or the equity could be used to recapitalize the failing financial company itself–thus, the highest layer of surviving bailed-in creditors would become the owners of the resolved firm. In either country, the new equity holders would take on the corresponding risk of being shareholders in a financial institution. [Emphasis added.]
No exception is indicated for “insured deposits” in the U.S., meaning those under $250,000, the deposits we thought were protected by FDIC insurance. This can hardly be an oversight, since it is the FDIC that is issuing the directive. The FDIC is an insurance company funded by premiums paid by private banks. The directive is called a “resolution process,” defined elsewhere as a plan that “would be triggered in the event of the failure of an insurer and would facilitate [the failed bank’s] resolution in a controlled manner, avoiding systemic disruption and use of public funds.” The only mention of “insured deposits”is in connection with existing UK legislation, which the FDIC-BOE directive goes on to say is inadequate, implying that it needs to be modified or overridden.
An Imminent Risk
If our IOUs are converted to bank stock, they will no longer be subject to insurance protection but will be “at risk” and vulnerable to being wiped out, just as the Lehman Brothers shareholders were in 2008. That this dire scenario could actually materialize was underscored by Yves Smith in a March 19 post titled When You Weren’t Looking, Democrat Bank Stooges Launch Bills to Permit Bailouts, Deregulate Derivatives. She writes:
In the U.S., depositors have actually been put in a worse position than Cyprus deposit-holders, at least if they are at the big banks that play in the derivatives casino. The regulators have turned a blind eye as banks use their depositaries to fund derivatives exposures. And as bad as that is, the depositors, unlike their Cypriot confreres, aren’t even senior creditors. Remember Lehman? When the investment bank failed, unsecured creditors (and remember, depositors are unsecured creditors) got eight cents on the dollar. One big reason was that derivatives counterparties require collateral for any exposures, meaning they are secured creditors. The 2005 bankruptcy reforms made derivatives counterparties senior to unsecured lenders. [Emphasis added.]
One might wonder why the posting of collateral by a derivative counterparty, at some percentage of full exposure, makes the creditor “secured,” while the depositor who posted collateral at 100 cents on the dollar is “unsecured.” But moving on — Smith writes:
Lehman had only two itty bitty banking subsidiaries, and to my knowledge, was not gathering retail deposits. But as readers may recall, Bank of America moved most of its derivatives from its Merrill Lynch operation [to] its depositary in late 2011.
Its “depositary” is the arm of the bank that takes deposits. At B of A, that means lots and lots of deposits. The deposits are now subject to being wiped out by a major derivatives loss. How bad could that be? Smith quotes Bloomberg:
… Bank of America’s holding company… held almost $75 trillion of derivatives at the end of June…
That compares with JPMorgan’s deposit-taking entity, JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, which contained 99 percent of the New York-based firm’s $79 trillion of notional derivatives, the OCC data show.
$75 trillion and $79 trillion in derivatives! These two mega-banks alone hold more in derivatives eachthan the entire global GDP (at $70 trillion).
Smith goes on:
… Remember the effect of the 2005 bankruptcy law revisions: derivatives counterparties are first in line, they get to grab assets first and leave everyone else to scramble for crumbs… Lehman failed over a weekend after JP Morgan grabbed collateral.
But it’s even worse than that. During the Savings & Loan crisis, the FDIC did not have enough in deposit insurance receipts to pay for the Resolution Trust Corporation wind-down vehicle. It had to get more funding from Congress. This move paves the way for another TARP-style shakedown of taxpayers, this time to save depositors.
Perhaps, but Congress has already been burned and is liable to balk a second time. Hence the need for the FDIC-BOE resolution. When it is implemented, the FDIC will no longer need to protect depositor funds; it can just confiscate them.
Note that an FDIC confiscation of deposits to recapitalize the banks is far different from a simple tax on taxpayers to pay government expenses. The government’s debt is at least arguably the people’s debt, since the government is there to provide services for the people. But when the banks get into trouble with their derivative schemes, they are not serving depositors, who are not getting a cut of the profits; and by no stretch of the imagination are the depositors liable for the losses. Taking depositor funds is simply theft. What should be done is to raise FDIC insurance premiums and make the banks pay to keep their depositors whole, but premiums are already high. The FDIC is a government agency, but like other regulatory agencies it is subject to regulatory capture. Deposit insurance has failed, and so has the private banking system that has depended on it for the trust that makes banking work.
Note too that imposing losses on depositors is not a “wealth tax” but is a tax on the poor, since wealthy people don’t keep most of their money in bank accounts. They keep it in the stock market, in real estate, in over-the-counter derivatives, in gold and silver, and so forth.
Are you safe, then, if your money is in gold and silver? Apparently not — if it’s stored in a safety deposit box in the bank. Homeland Security has reportedly told banks that it has authority to seize the contents of safety deposit boxes without a warrant when it’s a matter of “national security,” which a major bank crisis no doubt will be.
The Swedish Alternative: Nationalize the Banks
Another alternative was considered by President Obama in 2009 but was rejected: nationalize failed banks. In a February 2009 article titled “Are Uninsured Bank Depositors in Danger?,” Felix Salmon discussed a newsletter by Asia-based investment strategist Christopher Wood, in which Wood wrote:
It is… amazing that Obama does not understand the political appeal of the nationalization option… [D]espite this latest setback nationalization of the banks is coming sooner or later because the realities of the situation will demand it. The result will be shareholders wiped out and bondholders forced to take debt-for-equity swaps, if not hopefully depositors.
On whether depositors could be forced to become equity holders, Salmon commented:
It’s worth remembering that depositors are unsecured creditors of any bank; usually, indeed, they’re by far the largest class of unsecured creditors.
President Obama acknowledged that bank nationalization had worked in Sweden, and that the course pursued by the U.S. Fed had not worked in Japan, which wound up instead in a “lost decade.” But Obama opted for the Japanese approach because, according to Ed Harrison, “Americans will not tolerate nationalization.”
That was four years ago. When Americans realize that the alternative is to have their ready cash transformed into “bank stock” of questionable marketability, moving failed mega-banks into the public sector may start to have more appeal.
Soon, your cash will be confiscated – or will simply be worthless paper.
To make this happen, banks will be closing branches under the pretense its workers are quitting over fear of transmission of the COVID-19 coronavirus from bank customer to bank teller. Intentional central bank induced inflation will crush the purchasing power of the American dollar. Then there will be pre-planned shortages of cash and coin that will force the public to beg for currency reform – the elimination of paper money and its replacement with a digital money card, what the World Economic Forum calls THE 4TH DIGITAL INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION.
Every “digital dollar” will be programmed by the government…that means they will be able to “turn on or off” your money at will.
Not only that, but they’ll be able to TRACK and RECORD every purchase you make.
The digital dollar means Dems would be able to punish any contribution, purchase, or even social media comment they don’t like.
And this isn’t something years away… It’s starting now.
Biden’s secret army has been hard at work, and…US trials are already well underway.
In fact, our government is racing to catch up…
Quote: “We think it’s really important that the central bank maintain a stable currency and payments system for the public’s benefit. That’s one of our jobs,” Powell said. He noted the “transformational innovation” in the area of digital payments and said the Fed is continuing to do work on the matter, including its own FedNow system expected to go online in 2023.”
With its historical roots in the 1934 Technocratic Movement and later Non-Governmental Organisations such as the 1973 Trilateral Commission and New International Economic Order (NIEO), Agenda 21 is a non-binding action plan of the United Nations with regard to sustainable development.
Silent weapons
Through the United Nations, globalists are attempting to finalize their war against man, property rights, gun rights, and capitalism to usher in a Marxist World Order. One of their weapons is Agenda 21, a dark agenda for the 21st Century. It shoots situations propelled by technology and propaganda instead of bullets.
2020
Considered a conspiracy ‘theory’ by mainstream media and other apologists of globalization, the flagship term for Agenda 21 – ‘sustainable development’, appears in thousands of federal, state and local government laws, regulations, policies and documents. The UN says ‘sustainable development’ is simply the ‘Environmental Movement’ reconfiguring the planet into a safe, green world. Others maintain it’s the forced inventory and control of all land, water, minerals, plants, animals, building projects and human beings on the planet; a blueprint for what is morphing into a totalitarian world government right before our eyes.
SpaceX last week announced the launch of Starlink in Alaska, its high-speed satellite internet service that advocates say will beam broadband to every corner of the state.
Alaskans who have signed up for the service said they’re eager to try it. They expect it to provide faster, cheaper service than GCI, the state’s largest telecommunications company.
But Starlink is just one of several ongoing efforts that could transform telecommunications in the state, where more than 200 villages lack city-quality internet service.
SpaceX, owned by billionaire Elon Musk, builds and launches rockets that deliver gear into space, including the satellites for internet. SpaceX’s Starlink uses a series of low-Earth-orbiting satellites to send speedy signals to earth. It recently received glowing reviews from the Pentagon after the U.S. military found it provides high data and connectivity rates at remote Arctic bases.
North Pole resident Bert Somers said Monday that he’d give the service a B so far. In an interview, he said he’s too far outside of town to get wire-delivered internet from GCI.
On Monday, Somers installed his newly arrived Starlink dish on his roof. He first tested it on the snowy ground outside his home, chronicling it on his family’s YouTube video blog, “Somers in Alaska.”
The Starlink internet is fast but the signal glitched every few minutes, usually for several seconds, Somers said. He expects Starlink to improve as more satellites are deployed.
“I’m thinking it shows promise, but I don’t know if we’re firing on all cylinders at this point,” he said.
Another concern are operational limits that don’t exceed 22 below zero, according to the Starlink instructions, Somers said. Winter temperatures in Alaska can get lower than that, but he might use a small heater in the future to warm the dish if needed, he said.
The costs are a standard $600 for the gear. It’s $110 monthly, cheaper than broadband in town, Somers said. Once the signal is good enough, he can save money by dropping one of two cellphone providers that he and his wife, Jessica, use for slow home internet, he said.
“We don’t have a lot of other options here, so I’m pretty excited about it,” he said. “I think this will be the future, and this will make the other internet companies consider lowering their prices if this will be their competition.”
A level playing field for rural Alaska
Heather Handyside, a spokeswoman with GCI, said the company believes fiber-based internet is the best way to deliver the fastest speeds and almost unlimited data to customers. The company is actively extending fiber to additional rural communities, she said.
The company also has built a microwave network that delivers internet across much of rural Alaska.
Handyside said that GCI also recognizes that fiber-based internet is not feasible for many of Alaska’s most remote communities. GCI is meeting with satellite-based providers to help it provide better service in those remote locations, she said.
“We are excited about the potential of low earth orbit satellites to help connect the most remote parts of Alaska and we’ve been tracking closely as Starlink and other LEO-based providers deploy this new technology,” she said in a prepared statement.
Handyside said the cost and speed of GCI internet plans vary, depending on how internet is delivered in a location, such as by fiber or microwave. Rural plans range between $60 and $300.
Rural residents often complain that the costs go much higher because they say data limits can often be quickly exceeded.
John Wallace, a technology contractor in Bethel, the largest community in Western Alaska, said he recently got a notification from Starlink saying his gear is on its way.
[Earlier coverage: Alaska ramps up effort to land billions in federal funding to close digital divide]
When it arrives, his internet service will be several times faster than what GCI currently provides in Bethel, for a third of the price and much more data, he said.
Wallace and others say Starlink will vastly expand opportunities in rural Alaska, where many communities still struggle with slow dial-up speed at times. Affordability and internet capacity will improve substantially, sharply lowering costs for businesses, families and local governments, they say.
Wallace said Starlink will bring capacity to the home that only the school and clinic previously enjoyed. More people will be able to engage in e-commerce, remote work, online learning and many other fields.
“There are very few things we get in rural Alaska that allow us to stand on the same plane as everyone else, and this is one of those things,” Wallace said.
Another low-Earth-orbiting satellite internet service has been in place in Alaska for more than a year, through London-based OneWeb satellites, said Shawn Williams, with Pacific Dataport in Anchorage.
Pacific Dataport provides that broadband internet service to some villages, Williams said.
That includes Akiak, population 500, in the Bethel region.
That internet has given families in Akiak a fast, cheaper broadband option in the village, allowing many to get broadband at home, said Mike Williams, Akiak tribal president and no relation to Shawn Williams. He also chairs the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta Tribal Broadband Consortium, which sells the OneWeb signal to many village households for $75 monthly, he said.
Mike Williams said there are still glitches with the signal, but he said they are rare and are addressed quickly. The service has improved over time, he said.
“We’re seeing more people fixing household appliances through YouTube,” Mike Williams said. “We’re seeing economic development opportunities, like people selling furs and artwork. The kids are using it for education, and we have Zoom capabilities. And hopefully when we have some health issues, we can get that information online on what’s going on with our health.”
Early next year, Pacific Dataport also plans to launch its own high-tech satellite, the Aurora 4A, to provide satellite service across Alaska, Shawn Williams said.
Fiber coming to many villages
In other efforts, the federal government has awarded about $700 million to companies and tribes for new internet programs, with a focus on expanding the skeletal fiber-optic backbone in the state, according to officials with the Alaska Broadband Office.
That will extend broadband to about 80 more Alaska communities in the coming years. The communities are now considered underserved or unserved because they lack high-speed internet.
Much of the federal money is coming from the giant bipartisan infrastructure act passed last year by Congress.
The state’s broadband office, newly created this year, also plans to secure more federal funding to bring high-speed broadband to even more villages, said Thomas Lochner, the office director.
“We have a very strong opportunity within the state to close the digital divide,” Lochner said. “With the the transformational amounts of funding the federal government is bringing to the state to connect all of these communities, within the next 10 years, I predict 100% of Alaska communities will be connected with a robust broadband system.”
GCI is part of a partnership that’s been awarded $73 million to deliver fiber cable to Bethel and several other villages, reaching more than 10,000 people in Southwest Alaska. It’s just one of the projects receiving federal funding.
It should be in service in Bethel in 2024, followed by other communities, Handyside said.
Shawn Williams said fiber in Alaska is very expensive to deliver on a per-household basis, especially compared to the new satellite-based internet.
“When we run fiber, it’s not cheap, and when we do satellite broadband, it’s a lot more cost effective and deployment is a lot quicker too, without environmental impact studies,” he said.
The fiber-based service won’t be reaching new villages for another few years or more, Mike Williams of Akiak said. That means satellite-based broadband is the best option for many villages at the moment, whether it’s through OneWeb or SpaceX satellites, he said.
“It has been wonderful to have broadband internet for the past year,” he said.
The Trailblazing Patriot 