Oh. You mean America is not undergoing a pandemic? On average, abut 8000 people die per day from all causes in the United States. In the first 8 months of 2020 there were only ~1200 excess deaths per month or 40 extra deaths per day exclusively due to COVID-19 coronavirus infections, with 80% of those among American age 65 and older. By extrapolation, there were only ~8 excess COVID-19 only deaths per day among working-age adults and school-age children.
Translation: of the 161,392 accumulated COVID-19 RELATED deaths reported as of August 22, 2020 (80% being among Americans age 75 and older), only 6% or ~9683 accumulated deaths were classified as COVID-19 only. Among these COVID-19 only deaths, ~60% were age 75 and older; 80% were age 65 and older. So, there were only ~2000 COVID-only deaths in working age adults and school-age children.
Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1 . Policy. Advances in digital and distributed ledger technology for financial services have led to dramatic growth in markets for digital assets, with profound implications for the protection of consumers, investors, and businesses, including data privacy and security; financial stability and systemic risk; crime; national security; the ability to exercise human rights; financial inclusion and equity; and energy demand and climate change. In November 2021, non-state issued digital assets reached a combined market capitalization of $3 trillion, up from approximately $14 billion in early November 2016. Monetary authorities globally are also exploring, and in some cases introducing, central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).
While many activities involving digital assets are within the scope of existing domestic laws and regulations, an area where the United States has been a global leader, growing development and adoption of digital assets and related innovations, as well as inconsistent controls to defend against certain key risks, necessitate an evolution and alignment of the United States Government approach to digital assets. The United States has an interest in responsible financial innovation, expanding access to safe and affordable financial services, and reducing the cost of domestic and cross-border funds transfers and payments, including through the continued modernization of public payment systems. We must take strong steps to reduce the risks that digital assets could pose to consumers, investors, and business protections; financial stability and financial system integrity; combating and preventing crime and illicit finance; national security; the ability to exercise human rights; financial inclusion and equity; and climate change and pollution.
Sec. 2 . Objectives. The principal policy objectives of the United States with respect to digital assets are as follows:
(a) We must protect consumers, investors, and businesses in the United States. The unique and varied features of digital assets can pose significant financial risks to consumers, investors, and businesses if appropriate protections are not in place. In the absence of sufficient oversight and standards, firms providing digital asset services may provide inadequate protections for sensitive financial data, custodial and other arrangements relating to customer assets and funds, or disclosures of risks associated with investment. Cybersecurity and market failures at major digital asset exchanges and trading platforms have resulted in billions of dollars in losses. The United States should ensure that safeguards are in place and promote the responsible development of digital assets to protect consumers, investors, and businesses; maintain privacy; and shield against arbitrary or unlawful surveillance, which can contribute to human rights abuses.
(b) We must protect United States and global financial stability and mitigate systemic risk. Some digital asset trading platforms and service providers have grown rapidly in size and complexity and may not be subject to or in compliance with appropriate regulations or supervision. Digital asset issuers, exchanges and trading platforms, and intermediaries whose activities may increase risks to financial stability, should, as appropriate, be subject to and in compliance with regulatory and supervisory standards that govern traditional market infrastructures and financial firms, in line with the general Start Printed Page 14144 principle of “same business, same risks, same rules.” The new and unique uses and functions that digital assets can facilitate may create additional economic and financial risks requiring an evolution to a regulatory approach that adequately addresses those risks.
(c) We must mitigate the illicit finance and national security risks posed by misuse of digital assets. Digital assets may pose significant illicit finance risks, including money laundering, cybercrime and ransomware, narcotics and human trafficking, and terrorism and proliferation financing. Digital assets may also be used as a tool to circumvent United States and foreign financial sanctions regimes and other tools and authorities. Further, while the United States has been a leader in setting international standards for the regulation and supervision of digital assets for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), poor or nonexistent implementation of those standards in some jurisdictions abroad can present significant illicit financing risks for the United States and global financial systems. Illicit actors, including the perpetrators of ransomware incidents and other cybercrime, often launder and cash out of their illicit proceeds using digital asset service providers in jurisdictions that have not yet effectively implemented the international standards set by the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The continued availability of service providers in jurisdictions where international AML/CFT standards are not effectively implemented enables financial activity without illicit finance controls. Growth in decentralized financial ecosystems, peer-to-peer payment activity, and obscured blockchain ledgers without controls to mitigate illicit finance could also present additional market and national security risks in the future. The United States must ensure appropriate controls and accountability for current and future digital assets systems to promote high standards for transparency, privacy, and security—including through regulatory, governance, and technological measures—that counter illicit activities and preserve or enhance the efficacy of our national security tools. When digital assets are abused or used in illicit ways, or undermine national security, it is in the national interest to take actions to mitigate these illicit finance and national security risks through regulation, oversight, law enforcement action, or use of other United States Government authorities.
(d) We must reinforce United States leadership in the global financial system and in technological and economic competitiveness, including through the responsible development of payment innovations and digital assets. The United States has an interest in ensuring that it remains at the forefront of responsible development and design of digital assets and the technology that underpins new forms of payments and capital flows in the international financial system, particularly in setting standards that promote: democratic values; the rule of law; privacy; the protection of consumers, investors, and businesses; and interoperability with digital platforms, legacy architecture, and international payment systems. The United States derives significant economic and national security benefits from the central role that the United States dollar and United States financial institutions and markets play in the global financial system. Continued United States leadership in the global financial system will sustain United States financial power and promote United States economic interests.
(e) We must promote access to safe and affordable financial services. Many Americans are underbanked and the costs of cross-border money transfers and payments are high. The United States has a strong interest in promoting responsible innovation that expands equitable access to financial services, particularly for those Americans underserved by the traditional banking system, including by making investments and domestic and cross-border funds transfers and payments cheaper, faster, and safer, and by promoting greater and more cost-efficient access to financial products and services. The United States also has an interest in ensuring that the benefits of financial innovation are enjoyed equitably by all Americans and that any disparate impacts of financial innovation are mitigated. Start Printed Page 14145
(f) We must support technological advances that promote responsible development and use of digital assets. The technological architecture of different digital assets has substantial implications for privacy, national security, the operational security and resilience of financial systems, climate change, the ability to exercise human rights, and other national goals. The United States has an interest in ensuring that digital asset technologies and the digital payments ecosystem are developed, designed, and implemented in a responsible manner that includes privacy and security in their architecture, integrates features and controls that defend against illicit exploitation, and reduces negative climate impacts and environmental pollution, as may result from some cryptocurrency mining.
Sec. 3 . Coordination. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (APEP) shall coordinate, through the interagency process described in National Security Memorandum 2 of February 4, 2021 (Renewing the National Security Council System), the executive branch actions necessary to implement this order. The interagency process shall include, as appropriate: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Domestic Policy Council, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development. Representatives of other executive departments and agencies (agencies) and other senior officials may be invited to attend interagency meetings as appropriate, including, with due respect for their regulatory independence, representatives of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and other Federal regulatory agencies.
Sec. 4 . Policy and Actions Related to United States Central Bank Digital Currencies. (a) The policy of my Administration on a United States CBDC is as follows:
(i) Sovereign money is at the core of a well-functioning financial system, macroeconomic stabilization policies, and economic growth. My Administration places the highest urgency on research and development efforts into the potential design and deployment options of a United States CBDC. These efforts should include assessments of possible benefits and risks for consumers, investors, and businesses; financial stability and systemic risk; payment systems; national security; the ability to exercise human rights; financial inclusion and equity; and the actions required to launch a United States CBDC if doing so is deemed to be in the national interest.
(ii) My Administration sees merit in showcasing United States leadership and participation in international fora related to CBDCs and in multi-country conversations and pilot projects involving CBDCs. Any future dollar payment system should be designed in a way that is consistent with United States priorities (as outlined in section 4(a)(i) of this order) and democratic values, including privacy protections, and that ensures the global financial system has appropriate transparency, connectivity, and platform and architecture interoperability or transferability, as appropriate.
(iii) A United States CBDC may have the potential to support efficient and low-cost transactions, particularly for cross-border funds transfers and payments, and to foster greater access to the financial system, with fewer of the risks posed by private sector-administered digital assets. A United States CBDC that is interoperable with CBDCs issued by other monetary Start Printed Page 14146 authorities could facilitate faster and lower-cost cross-border payments and potentially boost economic growth, support the continued centrality of the United States within the international financial system, and help to protect the unique role that the dollar plays in global finance. There are also, however, potential risks and downsides to consider. We should prioritize timely assessments of potential benefits and risks under various designs to ensure that the United States remains a leader in the international financial system.
(b) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit to the President a report on the future of money and payment systems, including the conditions that drive broad adoption of digital assets; the extent to which technological innovation may influence these outcomes; and the implications for the United States financial system, the modernization of and changes to payment systems, economic growth, financial inclusion, and national security. This report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. Based on the potential United States CBDC design options, this report shall include an analysis of:
(i) the potential implications of a United States CBDC, based on the possible design choices, for national interests, including implications for economic growth and stability;
(ii) the potential implications a United States CBDC might have on financial inclusion;
(iii) the potential relationship between a CBDC and private sector-administered digital assets;
(iv) the future of sovereign and privately produced money globally and implications for our financial system and democracy;
(v) the extent to which foreign CBDCs could displace existing currencies and alter the payment system in ways that could undermine United States financial centrality;
(vi) the potential implications for national security and financial crime, including an analysis of illicit financing risks, sanctions risks, other law enforcement and national security interests, and implications for human rights; and
(vii) an assessment of the effects that the growth of foreign CBDCs may have on United States interests generally.
(c) The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Chairman of the Federal Reserve) is encouraged to continue to research and report on the extent to which CBDCs could improve the efficiency and reduce the costs of existing and future payments systems, to continue to assess the optimal form of a United States CBDC, and to develop a strategic plan for Federal Reserve and broader United States Government action, as appropriate, that evaluates the necessary steps and requirements for the potential implementation and launch of a United States CBDC. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve is also encouraged to evaluate the extent to which a United States CBDC, based on the potential design options, could enhance or impede the ability of monetary policy to function effectively as a critical macroeconomic stabilization tool.
(d) The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, shall:
(i) within 180 days of the date of this order, provide to the President through the APNSA and APEP an assessment of whether legislative changes would be necessary to issue a United States CBDC, should it be deemed appropriate and in the national interest; and Start Printed Page 14147
(ii) within 210 days of the date of this order, provide to the President through the APNSA and the APEP a corresponding legislative proposal, based on consideration of the report submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury under section 4(b) of this order and any materials developed by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve consistent with section 4(c) of this order.
Sec. 5 . Measures to Protect Consumers, Investors, and Businesses. (a) The increased use of digital assets and digital asset exchanges and trading platforms may increase the risks of crimes such as fraud and theft, other statutory and regulatory violations, privacy and data breaches, unfair and abusive acts or practices, and other cyber incidents faced by consumers, investors, and businesses. The rise in use of digital assets, and differences across communities, may also present disparate financial risk to less informed market participants or exacerbate inequities. It is critical to ensure that digital assets do not pose undue risks to consumers, investors, or businesses, and to put in place protections as a part of efforts to expand access to safe and affordable financial services.
(b) Consistent with the goals stated in section 5(a) of this order:
(i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor and the heads of other relevant agencies, including, as appropriate, the heads of independent regulatory agencies such as the FTC, the SEC, the CFTC, Federal banking agencies, and the CFPB, shall submit to the President a report, or section of the report required by section 4 of this order, on the implications of developments and adoption of digital assets and changes in financial market and payment system infrastructures for United States consumers, investors, businesses, and for equitable economic growth. One section of the report shall address the conditions that would drive mass adoption of different types of digital assets and the risks and opportunities such growth might present to United States consumers, investors, and businesses, including a focus on how technological innovation may impact these efforts and with an eye toward those most vulnerable to disparate impacts. The report shall also include policy recommendations, including potential regulatory and legislative actions, as appropriate, to protect United States consumers, investors, and businesses, and support expanding access to safe and affordable financial services. The report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(ii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Chief Technology Officer of the United States, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit to the President a technical evaluation of the technological infrastructure, capacity, and expertise that would be necessary at relevant agencies to facilitate and support the introduction of a CBDC system should one be proposed. The evaluation should specifically address the technical risks of the various designs, including with respect to emerging and future technological developments, such as quantum computing. The evaluation should also include any reflections or recommendations on how the inclusion of digital assets in Federal processes may affect the work of the United States Government and the provision of Government services, including risks and benefits to cybersecurity, customer experience, and social-safety-net programs. The evaluation shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(iii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the President a report on the role of law enforcement agencies in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting criminal activity related to digital assets. The report shall include any recommendations on regulatory or legislative actions, as appropriate. Start Printed Page 14148
(iv) The Attorney General, the Chair of the FTC, and the Director of the CFPB are each encouraged to consider what, if any, effects the growth of digital assets could have on competition policy.
(v) The Chair of the FTC and the Director of the CFPB are each encouraged to consider the extent to which privacy or consumer protection measures within their respective jurisdictions may be used to protect users of digital assets and whether additional measures may be needed.
(vi) The Chair of the SEC, the Chairman of the CFTC, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency are each encouraged to consider the extent to which investor and market protection measures within their respective jurisdictions may be used to address the risks of digital assets and whether additional measures may be needed.
(vii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Assistant to the President and National Climate Advisor, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit a report to the President on the connections between distributed ledger technology and short-, medium-, and long-term economic and energy transitions; the potential for these technologies to impede or advance efforts to tackle climate change at home and abroad; and the impacts these technologies have on the environment. This report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. The report should also address the effect of cryptocurrencies’ consensus mechanisms on energy usage, including research into potential mitigating measures and alternative mechanisms of consensus and the design tradeoffs those may entail. The report should specifically address:
(A) potential uses of blockchain that could support monitoring or mitigating technologies to climate impacts, such as exchanging of liabilities for greenhouse gas emissions, water, and other natural or environmental assets; and
(B) implications for energy policy, including as it relates to grid management and reliability, energy efficiency incentives and standards, and sources of energy supply.
(viii) Within 1 year of submission of the report described in section 5(b)(vii) of this order, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall update the report described in section 5(b)(vii) of this order, including to address any knowledge gaps identified in such report.
Sec. 6 . Actions to Promote Financial Stability, Mitigate Systemic Risk, and Strengthen Market Integrity. (a) Financial regulators—including the SEC, the CFTC, and the CFPB and Federal banking agencies—play critical roles in establishing and overseeing protections across the financial system that safeguard its integrity and promote its stability. Since 2017, the Secretary of the Treasury has convened the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to assess the financial stability risks and regulatory gaps posed by the ongoing adoption of digital assets. The United States must assess and take steps to address risks that digital assets pose to financial stability and financial market integrity.
(b) Within 210 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury should convene the FSOC and produce a report outlining the specific financial stability risks and regulatory gaps posed by various types of digital assets and providing recommendations to address such risks. As the Secretary Start Printed Page 14149 of the Treasury and the FSOC deem appropriate, the report should consider the particular features of various types of digital assets and include recommendations that address the identified financial stability risks posed by these digital assets, including any proposals for additional or adjusted regulation and supervision as well as for new legislation. The report should take account of the prior analyses and assessments of the FSOC, agencies, and the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, including the ongoing work of the Federal banking agencies, as appropriate.
Sec. 7 . Actions to Limit Illicit Finance and Associated National Security Risks. (a) Digital assets have facilitated sophisticated cybercrime-related financial networks and activity, including through ransomware activity. The growing use of digital assets in financial activity heightens risks of crimes such as money laundering, terrorist and proliferation financing, fraud and theft schemes, and corruption. These illicit activities highlight the need for ongoing scrutiny of the use of digital assets, the extent to which technological innovation may impact such activities, and exploration of opportunities to mitigate these risks through regulation, supervision, public-private engagement, oversight, and law enforcement.
(b) Within 90 days of submission to the Congress of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies may each submit to the President supplemental annexes, which may be classified or unclassified, to the Strategy offering additional views on illicit finance risks posed by digital assets, including cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and trends in the use of digital assets by illicit actors.
(c) Within 120 days of submission to the Congress of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies shall develop a coordinated action plan based on the Strategy’s conclusions for mitigating the digital-asset-related illicit finance and national security risks addressed in the updated strategy. This action plan shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. The action plan shall address the role of law enforcement and measures to increase financial services providers’ compliance with AML/CFT obligations related to digital asset activities.
(d) Within 120 days following completion of all of the following reports—the National Money Laundering Risk Assessment; the National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment; the National Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment; and the updated National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing—the Secretary of the Treasury shall notify the relevant agencies through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order on any pending, proposed, or prospective rulemakings to address digital asset illicit finance risks. The Secretary of the Treasury shall consult with and consider the perspectives of relevant agencies in evaluating opportunities to mitigate such risks through regulation.
Sec. 8 . Policy and Actions Related to Fostering International Cooperation and United States Competitiveness. (a) The policy of my Administration on fostering international cooperation and United States competitiveness with respect to digital assets and financial innovation is as follows:
(i) Technology-driven financial innovation is frequently cross-border and therefore requires international cooperation among public authorities. This cooperation is critical to maintaining high regulatory standards and a level playing field. Uneven regulation, supervision, and compliance across jurisdictions creates opportunities for arbitrage and raises risks to financial Start Printed Page 14150 stability and the protection of consumers, investors, businesses, and markets. Inadequate AML/CFT regulation, supervision, and enforcement by other countries challenges the ability of the United States to investigate illicit digital asset transaction flows that frequently jump overseas, as is often the case in ransomware payments and other cybercrime-related money laundering. There must also be cooperation to reduce inefficiencies in international funds transfer and payment systems.
(ii) The United States Government has been active in international fora and through bilateral partnerships on many of these issues and has a robust agenda to continue this work in the coming years. While the United States held the position of President of the FATF, the United States led the group in developing and adopting the first international standards on digital assets. The United States must continue to work with international partners on standards for the development and appropriate interoperability of digital payment architectures and CBDCs to reduce payment inefficiencies and ensure that any new funds transfer and payment systems are consistent with United States values and legal requirements.
(iii) While the United States held the position of President of the 2020 G7, the United States established the G7 Digital Payments Experts Group to discuss CBDCs, stablecoins, and other digital payment issues. The G7 report outlining a set of policy principles for CBDCs is an important contribution to establishing guidelines for jurisdictions for the exploration and potential development of CBDCs. While a CBDC would be issued by a country’s central bank, the supporting infrastructure could involve both public and private participants. The G7 report highlighted that any CBDC should be grounded in the G7’s long-standing public commitments to transparency, the rule of law, and sound economic governance, as well as the promotion of competition and innovation.
(iv) The United States continues to support the G20 roadmap for addressing challenges and frictions with cross-border funds transfers and payments for which work is underway, including work on improvements to existing systems for cross-border funds transfers and payments, the international dimensions of CBDC designs, and the potential of well-regulated stablecoin arrangements. The international Financial Stability Board (FSB), together with standard-setting bodies, is leading work on issues related to stablecoins, cross-border funds transfers and payments, and other international dimensions of digital assets and payments, while FATF continues its leadership in setting AML/CFT standards for digital assets. Such international work should continue to address the full spectrum of issues and challenges raised by digital assets, including financial stability, consumer, investor, and business risks, and money laundering, terrorist financing, proliferation financing, sanctions evasion, and other illicit activities.
(v) My Administration will elevate the importance of these topics and expand engagement with our critical international partners, including through fora such as the G7, G20, FATF, and FSB. My Administration will support the ongoing international work and, where appropriate, push for additional work to drive development and implementation of holistic standards, cooperation and coordination, and information sharing. With respect to digital assets, my Administration will seek to ensure that our core democratic values are respected; consumers, investors, and businesses are protected; appropriate global financial system connectivity and platform and architecture interoperability are preserved; and the safety and soundness of the global financial system and international monetary system are maintained.
(b) In furtherance of the policy stated in section 8(a) of this order:
(i) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall establish a framework for interagency international engagement with foreign counterparts and Start Printed Page 14151 in international fora to, as appropriate, adapt, update, and enhance adoption of global principles and standards for how digital assets are used and transacted, and to promote development of digital asset and CBDC technologies consistent with our values and legal requirements. This framework shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. This framework shall include specific and prioritized lines of effort and coordinated messaging; interagency engagement and activities with foreign partners, such as foreign assistance and capacity-building efforts and coordination of global compliance; and whole-of-government efforts to promote international principles, standards, and best practices. This framework should reflect ongoing leadership by the Secretary of the Treasury and financial regulators in relevant international financial standards bodies, and should elevate United States engagement on digital assets issues in technical standards bodies and other international fora to promote development of digital asset and CBDC technologies consistent with our values.
(ii) Within 1 year of the date of the establishment of the framework required by section 8(b)(i) of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other relevant agencies as appropriate, shall submit a report to the President on priority actions taken under the framework and its effectiveness. This report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(iii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall establish a framework for enhancing United States economic competitiveness in, and leveraging of, digital asset technologies. This framework shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(iv) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit a report to the President on how to strengthen international law enforcement cooperation for detecting, investigating, and prosecuting criminal activity related to digital assets.
Sec. 9 . Definitions. For the purposes of this order:
(a) The term “blockchain” refers to distributed ledger technologies where data is shared across a network that creates a digital ledger of verified transactions or information among network participants and the data are typically linked using cryptography to maintain the integrity of the ledger and execute other functions, including transfer of ownership or value.
(b) The term “central bank digital currency” or “CBDC” refers to a form of digital money or monetary value, denominated in the national unit of account, that is a direct liability of the central bank.
(c) The term “cryptocurrencies” refers to a digital asset, which may be a medium of exchange, for which generation or ownership records are supported through a distributed ledger technology that relies on cryptography, such as a blockchain.
(d) The term “digital assets” refers to all CBDCs, regardless of the technology used, and to other representations of value, financial assets and instruments, or claims that are used to make payments or investments, or to transmit or exchange funds or the equivalent thereof, that are issued or represented in digital form through the use of distributed ledger technology. For example, digital assets include cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and CBDCs. Regardless of the label used, a digital asset may be, among other things, a security, a commodity, a derivative, or other financial product. Start Printed Page 14152 Digital assets may be exchanged across digital asset trading platforms, including centralized and decentralized finance platforms, or through peer-to-peer technologies.
(e) The term “stablecoins” refers to a category of cryptocurrencies with mechanisms that are aimed at maintaining a stable value, such as by pegging the value of the coin to a specific currency, asset, or pool of assets or by algorithmically controlling supply in response to changes in demand in order to stabilize value.
Sec. 10 . General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
THE WHITE HOUSE, March 9, 2022. Filed 3-11-22; 8:45 am]
Whatever you may currently think about the SARS-CoV-2 vaccines, it is a fact that more than 5.41 billion people worldwide have received a dose of some type of COVID-19 vaccine, equal to about 70.5 percent of the world population. In the United States as of October 17, 2022, 494.74 million “initial protocol doses” of SARS-CoV-2 vaccine have been administered, together with 138.16 million “booster” doses. 265.59 million US residents have received at least one dose, and 226.59 million have completed the initial vaccination protocol (see this link), out of a total population of 335.49 million (67.5%). In terms of the logistics of development, manufacturing and deployment of a novel injectable biologic product, this is undeniably a major achievement.
Of the SARS-CoV-2 mRNA vaccine doses administered in the United States as of October 19, 2022:
375.64M doses of Pfizer/Bio-N-Tech 237.61 doses of Moderna
Total U.S. of 613.25M mRNA vaccine doses administered.
In the European Union, the corresponding numbers are:
641.89M doses of Pfizer/Bio-N-Tech 153.16M doses of Moderna
EU total of 795.05M mRNA vaccine doses administered
Grand Total of 1 Billion
408.3 million doses of mRNA vaccines in these two regions.All this involves a novel technology, product and large scale manufacturing process which was created, passed non-clinical and clinical development and was massively manufactured, distributed and globally deployed in less than three years.
At a meeting of the Special Committee of the European Union Parliament held on 11 October 2022 to discuss the findings regarding COVID-19 pandemic and recommendations for the future, a Pfizer executive confirmed that the vaccine had never been tested for its ability to prevent the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 virus before being put on the market. Data emerging since the introduction of the vaccine indicates that it is in fact unable to do so, thereby refuting the claim that the COVID-19 Passports provide any guarantee of protection. In other words, although governments throughout the world employed a wide range of propaganda and censorship methods to promote these products as both safe and effective at stopping the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection, there were no studies performed prior to this distribution which even tested how well the products would prevent the spread of COVID-19 disease. It is not an exaggeration to state that this massive deployment has been the largest clinical experiment performed on human beings in the history of the world.
All of the mRNA vaccine doses administered in the United States (to both citizens and military personnel) have been provided under “Emergency Use Authorization” (EUA), which is to say that although the FDA has licensed the Pfizer/Bio-N-Tech and Moderna vaccines for some age cohorts, the firms have elected to not manufacture, distribute, or market these licensed products in the United States. The reason for this is not clear, but appears to relate to both liability issues as well as conditions placed by the FDA involving additional clinical studies, safety monitoring (pharmacovigilance) and product disclosures once the products begin to be marketed.
From the standpoint of the vaccine manufacturers, EUA is a preferred pathway for marketing their products. A single purchaser (the US Government) provides complete liability indemnification, a guaranteed market with very little oversight, and manages both the distribution and marketing. In the case of all unlicensed products, the manufacturers are prohibited from marketing them, but under EUA the US Government has been doing this for them, and has been acting in coordination with corporate media, social media, and large technology firms to suppress any discussion of risks or limitations of the products. From the standpoint of the vaccine manufacturers, this is all profit and no risk; a perfect business model. Why would they ever want to consider taking up the burden of actually producing and marketing the licensed version of these products?
EUA is a process defined by US federal law (21 U.S. Code § 360bbb–3 – Authorization for medical products for use in emergencies) which in the case of these mRNA-based products involves biological products which are not approved, licensed, or cleared for commercial distribution. Specifically, the statute authorizes “the introduction into interstate commerce, during the effective period of a declaration under subsection (b), of a drug, device, or biological product intended for use in an actual or potential emergency.” Continued “Emergency Use Authorization” of these vaccines requires “a determination by the Secretary of Homeland Security that there is a domestic emergency, or a significant potential for a domestic emergency, involving a heightened risk of attack with a biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent or agents”. Once the domestic emergency has passed (ergo “a determination by the Secretary, in consultation as appropriate with the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary of Defense, that the circumstances described in paragraph (1) have ceased to exist”), “A declaration under this subsection shall terminate”. In other words, when there is no longer an emergency, the “Emergency Use Authorization” for the product will cease, and the vaccine products will return to their status as not approved, licensed, or cleared for commercial distribution. These products remain experimental, and are only to be used for a limited amount of time during an ongoing emergency.
“Pseudouridine likely affects multiple facets of mRNA function, including reduced immune stimulation by several mechanisms, prolonged half-life of pseudouridine-containing RNA, as well as potentially deleterious effects of Ψ on translation fidelity and efficiency.”
Based on the currently available information, it appears to me that the extensive random incorporation of pseudouridine into the synthetic mRNA-like molecules used for the Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna SARS-CoV-2 vaccines may well account for much or all of the observed immunosuppression, DNA virus reactivation, and remarkable persistence of the synthetic “mRNA” molecules observed in lymph node biopsy tissues (Roltgen et al. 2022). Many of these adverse effects were reported by Kariko, Weissman et al in their 2008 paper “Incorporation of pseudouridine into mRNA yields superior nonimmunogenic vector with increased translational capacity and biological stability” (Kariko et al. 2008) and could have been anticipated by regulatory and toxicology professionals if they had bothered to consider these findings prior to allowing emergency use authorization and widespread (global) deployment of what is truly an immature and previously untested technology. Therefore, neither the FDA, NIH, CDC, nor BioNTech (which employs Dr. Kariko as a Vice President) nor Moderna can claim true ignorance. To my eyes, what we have seen is more appropriately classified as “willful ignorance”.
Based on my review of the scientific data, it is my opinion that the random and uncontrolled insertion of pseudouridine into the manufactured “mRNA”-like molecules creates a population of polymers which may resemble natural mRNA, but which have a variety of properties which are clinically relevant. These characteristics and activities may account for many of the unusual effects, unusual stability, and striking adverse events associated with this new class of vaccines. These molecules are not natural mRNA, and they do not behave like natural mRNA.
The question that most troubles and perplexes me at this point is why the biological consequences of these modifications and associated clinical adverse effects were not thoroughly investigated before widespread administration of random pseudouridine-incorporating “mRNA”-like molecules to a global population.
Biology, and particularly molecular biology, is highly complex and interrelated. Change one thing over here, and it is really hard to predict what might happen over there. That is why one must do rigorously controlled non-clinical and clinical research. Once again, it appears to me that the hubris of “elite” high status scientists, physicians and governmental “public health” bureaucrats has overcome common sense, well established regulatory norms have been disregarded, and patients have unnecessarily suffered as a consequence. These products do not use natural mRNA, and referring to them as mRNA vaccines is misleading. I recommend that, in the future, these products which employ a synthetic unnatural polymer which is not natural mRNA, should be designated using a different term, such as Ψ-mRNA genetic medicines.
The White House pressured the Democratic mayor of El Paso, Texas, to not declare a state of emergency over the city’s migrant crisis due to fear it would make President Biden look bad, The Post has learned.
At least three of the El Paso City Council’s eight members have urged Mayor Oscar Leeser to issue an emergency declaration in response to the thousands of migrants who’ve filled the city’s shelters and are being housed in local hotels, sources familiar with the matter said.
But Leeser admitted during a private phone conversation last month that he’d been directed otherwise by the Biden administration, one of the officials told The Post.
“He told me the White House asked him not to,” Council member Claudia Rodriguez said.
Rodriguez also said Leeser has repeatedly assured her that he’d declare a state of emergency “if things got worse” — without saying what that meant.
US Rep. Tony Gonzales (R-Texas), whose district covers rural areas and border towns near El Paso, also said he heard similar accounts from other city officials.
“It is a sleight of hand what the administration is doing — pressuring the local government to not issue a declaration of emergency, to say as if everything is going OK,” he said.
Gonzales also alleged that the White House has done “the same thing in other parts of my district,” which have also seen huge numbers of migrants seeking refuge.
Leeser declined to speak with The Post but said in a prepared statement, “I don’t bow to pressure from any side.”
“I make decisions based on current circumstances and in the best interest of the citizens of El Paso,” the statement said.
Leeser also praised the federal government for providing his city with “critical” assistance.
At a Sept. 27 City Council meeting, Mayor Leeser also addressed the issue, saying Congresswoman Veronica Escobar (D-Texas) had urged him not to declare a State of Emergency, adding: “The White House has asked, at this point, for us not to do that and they’ll continue to work with us and continue to give us … money through [the] Federal Emergency Management Agency.”
Figures posted on El Paso’s official website show the city has received only $2 million in federal reimbursements toward the $8 million it has spent dealing with the migrant crisis.
The total cost could end up being much more, with ElPasomatters.org reporting in September the city was spending as much as $300,000 a day to shelter, feed and transport asylum-seeking immigrants.
In May, The Post first reported how officials in El Paso were considering declaring a state of emergency ahead of the expected ending of pandemic-related expulsions of border-crossers under Title 42 of the federal Public Health Services Act.
The move would have made the city and county eligible for state and federal funding to open additional shelters for housing migrants.
But the following day, El Paso County Judge Ricardo Samaniego said that “the mayor and I backed off,” telling The Post that “we found out that there’s very little difference between the funding we’re getting now and the funding that we would get if it went up to the governor and the governor sent it to President Biden.”
At the time, about 700 migrants a day were arriving in El Paso.
But that number topped 2,100 a day last week before dropping down to around 1,600 a day, according to the latest information posted Monday on the city’s website.
Between April and mid-September more than 62,000 migrants had crossed the border at El Paso alone.
El Paso has relocated more than 10,000 migrants by bus to New York City since August, with Lesser revealing at a public meeting last month that he got a green light to do so from Mayor Eric Adams.
The front cover of the New York Post for Oct. 18, 2022.
Adams has denied that assertion and publicly called on Leeser to end the program earlier this month, saying “New York cannot accommodate the number of buses that we have coming here to our city.”
The Oct. 7 appeal came the same day Hizzoner declared a state of emergency in the Big Apple over its migrant crisis.
But the buses have continued rolling to the city from El Paso, most recently on Sunday.
Leeser has said that most of the migrants flooding El Paso come from Venezuela.
In recent days, migrants have been able to simply walk across the dried-up Rio Grande, surrender to US Customs and Border Protection officials and get released after saying they intend to seek political asylum.
Last week, the US and Mexican governments announced a deal under which Venezuelans who cross into the US would be sent back to Mexico.
But border sources told The Post that the agreement was only being enforced in a small number of cases.
The White House didn’t immediately return a request for comment.
Judicial Watch: Biden National Archives Withholds 1,500 Pages of Records about Trump Raid – Hides 99% of Records
(Washington, DC) – Judicial Watch announced today that the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) is releasing only 65 pages out of over 1,600 pages of records related to the Biden administration’s unprecedented raid on the home of former President Trump.
The records are being sought under August 2022 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia after the National Archives and Records Administration failed to respond adequately to a February 2022 FOIA request (Judicial Watch v National Archives and Records Administration (No. 1:22-cv-02535). Judicial Watch asks for:
All records regarding the referral from NARA to the Department of Justice regarding the records management procedures of former President Donald Trump (https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/national-archives-asks-doj-investigate-trumps-handling-white/story?id=82781128 ). This request includes all related records of communication between any official or employee of NARA and any official or employee of the Department of Justice and/or any other branch, department, agency, or office of the federal government.
All records regarding the retrieval of records from President Trump or any individual or entity acting on his behalf by the National Archives and Records Administration. This request includes related records of communication between any official or employee of NARA and President Trump and/or any individual or entity acting on his behalf.
On October 3 the Archives released documents for only two categories of records: 1.) all emails between NARA officials and representatives of former President Trump and 2.) NARA emails to external entities other than Trump representatives related to the 15 boxes as of March 31, 2022.
The Archives recently sent Judicial Watch two letters in which it stated it found 309 pages relating to Category 1 but was releasing only 11 pages, less than one percent, nine pages in full and 2 in part.
The Archives wrote it found 1,303 pages of emails in Category 2 but was releasing only 54 of those pages, 39 in full, 15 with redactions. Again, less than one percent of the records.
The National Archives released a few pages of correspondence with Congress and an email with former President Trump’s representatives in which the Archives asserted alleged authority over records in Trump’s personal possession.
NARA referred to numerous FOIA exemptions as the reasons for its withholdings:
Exemption (b)(5) was asserted to protect NARA’s deliberations with Trump’s representatives, Congress, and other federal agencies.
Exemption (b)(6) was asserted to protect personal privacy.
Exemption (b)(7)(A) was asserted to withhold records compiled for law enforcement purposes.
Exemption (b)(7)(C) was asserted to withhold records compiled for law enforcement purposes, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
Exemption (b)(7)(E) was asserted to protect law enforcement information related to techniques and procedures that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.
“The Biden administration is in cover-up mode on its abusive and unprecedented raid of former President Trump’s home,” stated Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton. “The National Archives pretends to be concerned to public access to public information while unlawfully ignoring FOIA law and using a myriad of excuses to hide records about its manufactured dispute over the Trump records.”
Judicial Watch is in the forefront in the court battle for transparency regarding the abusive Biden raid on Trump’s home.
In August, Judicial Watch forced the release of the raid affidavit through its court request to unseal the warrant materials used in the unprecedented raid on the home of former President Trump.
Judicial Watch also just filed two lawsuits against the Justice Department and DOJ and FBI for records of the Mar-a-Lago raid search warrant application and approval, as well as communications about the warrant between the FBI, Executive Office of the President and the Secret Service.
Biden’s DHS Confirms Plans to Siphon Healthcare Services Away from Veterans to Illegal Aliens at Border
This is lower than low. Just look at the smug look on that scumbag’s face. He needs to locked up NOW!!
President Joe Biden’s Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has seemingly confirmed plans to siphon healthcare services away from American veterans treated at Veterans Affairs (VA) to illegal aliens arriving at the United States-Mexico border.
During a hearing before the House Homeland Security Committee on Wednesday, DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas confirmed to Rep. Ashley Hinson (R-IA) that the Biden administration is in talks with VA officials to potentially transfer doctors and nurses to the southern border to treat illegal aliens arriving every day in record-breaking numbers.
“Is the department planning to reallocate resources, doctors and nurses, from our VA system intended to care for our veterans to illegal immigrants at our southern border?” Hinson asked.
Mayorkas responded, stating that “the resources that the medical personnel from the Veterans Administration would allocate to this effort is under the judgment of the secretary of Veterans Affairs, who prioritizes the interests of veterans above all others for very noble and correct.”
When Hinson asked if Mayorkas had any conversations about the plan, he responded, “I have not personally, but of course, our teams, our personnel have. and I’d be very pleased to follow up with you.”
The remarks come as Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO) had sought clarification on reports that the Biden administration was looking to siphon doctors and nurses away from the VA toward illegal aliens at the border.
“In the words of one [Customs and Border Protection] official, ‘We’re going to take medical services away from people that really deserve that, who went to combat … to give free medical attention to illegal migrants,’” Hawley wrote in a letter to Mayorkas.
Already, Americans are forced to subsidize medical care for illegal aliens to the tune of $18.5 billion annually. Last year alone, Americans footed the bill for more than $316 million in medical care for border crossers and illegal aliens who were detained in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody.
John Binder is a reporter for Breitbart News.
Email him at firstname.lastname@example.org. Follow him on Twitter here.
People walk through Sky Harbor ICDC Extends Federal Mask Mandate
The order, which was to expire on April 18, will remain in place until May 3 to let officials at the agency assess whether the BA.2 virus subvariant drives a fresh wave of cases. “In order to assess the potential impact the rise of cases has on severe disease, including hospitalizations and deaths, and health care system capacity, the CDC order will remain in place at this time,” the CDC said in a statement.
The order was first imposed in January 2021 and applies to trains, airplanes, and other modes of transportation under purview of federal officials, as well as transportation hubs such as airports. The CDC has repeatedly extended the order, despite growing opposition to the move.
Leaders of 10 U.S. airlines in a letter last month urged the Biden administration to rescind the order, noting that COVID-19 metrics have plunged and that authorities across the country have rolled back or eliminated restrictions.
Separately, groups of pilots and flight attendants filed lawsuits against the CDC and its parent agency, alleging the mask order is unlawful.
Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, a Republican, said in a statement that the latest extension “simply prolongs the misery that passengers and flight attendants are being forced to endure.” “This is not evidence-based, but simply more COVID theater,” he said.
The CDC’s move came after it said it would allow the expiration of Title 42, a pandemic-era order that enabled quick expulsion of illegal immigrants because they might carry the virus that causes COVID-19.CDC Director Dr. Rochelle Walensky said the action was taken because COVID-19 cases fell by over 95 percent between January and March and because more of the population has some form of immunity from vaccination and/or prior infection.According to data reported to the CDC, about 36,300 COVID-19 cases were recorded on April 11. That was a slight increase from the week prior.COVID-19-related hospitalizations and deaths are also relatively flat after bottoming out following January’s peaks.Some experts pin the rise in cases on BA.2, a subvariant of the Omicron strain of the CCP virus, which causes COVID-19.White House COVID-19 coordinator Ashish Jha had said earlier this week that a mask mandate extension was “absolutely on the table” but that it would be up to the CDC whether to allow the mandate to expire or extend it once again
President Joe Biden, in a widely expected but nevertheless highly disappointing to many anti-illegal immigration activists move, decided to end Title 42, an immigration law implemented by the Trump Administration that gave immigration authorities the ability to more easily and quickly get rid of illegal immigrants. Just the News, reporting on that move, notes that:
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention announced Friday the end of enforcement of Title 42, a decades-old federal law impose by the Trump administration to limit immigration to stop the spread of COVID-19 during the pandemic.
The announcement was widely expected and will be effective May 23, a date that was also expected.
The CDC, the agency technically responsible for the law because it related to public health and the pandemic, announced the end of Title 42 by saying in a statement that:
“In consultation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), this termination will be implemented on May 23, 2022, to enable DHS time to implement appropriate COVID-19 mitigation protocols, such as scaling up a program to provide COVID-19 vaccinations to migrants and prepare for resumption of regular migration under Title 8.
“After considering current public health conditions and an increased availability of tools to fight COVID-19 (such as highly effective vaccines and therapeutics), the CDC Director has determined that an Order suspending the right to introduce migrants into the United States is no longer necessary.“
Team Biden, for its part, argued that ending the measure would not mean that illegal immigrants would be able to stay in the US, arguing in a press conference conducted by Kate Beddingfield that:
“To be clear, most individuals who crossed the border without legal authorization will be promptly placed into removal proceedings and if they are unable to establish a legal basis to remain in the United States, they’ll be expeditiously removed.
“As a reminder, economic need and flight from generalized violence is not a basis for asylum, but rather asylum is for those with a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground.”
Biden’s lackey can claim whatever she wants, but illegal immigrants themselves don’t seem to believe her. They, supposedly in desperate need of help but still somehow able to stay up to date on changes to US policy, have been massing around the border in expectation of Title 42 being done away with. As I reported a few days ago:
[A]ccording to Axios, there are not only perhaps 170,000 migrants waiting to head to the border once Title 42 ends, but there are also perhaps 25,000 migrants waiting along the US-Mexico border to cross once it’ll be harder to deport them.
So, while Team Biden claims that getting rid of a major tool for removing illegals won’t prove deleterious to the anti-illegal immigration mission, a tool Yahoo reports has been used about 1.7 million times in the Biden presidency, the illegal immigrants who are risking the border crossing seem to think otherwise. That means, at the very least, that the Border Patrol officer bravely manning the border despite Biden’s bumbling could soon have an even larger problem to deal with.