BREAKING: House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Rep Mark Green tells us he has just learned all Democrats on the committee are pulling out from attending a field hearing about the border crisis in Texas on Wednesday. He says that’s despite several Dems confirming attendance, & inviting their own minority witness, who is confirmed on the federal panel. US Border Patrol Chief Raul Ortiz is also set to testify. Chairman Green says he was given no reason for the abrupt pullout. Chairman Green’s statement below. #FoxNews
Homeland Security committee Dems confirm that they will not be attending the border hearing
They say that they never agreed to attend in the first place so they are not “pulling out.”
It’s time America takes ACTION! SPEAK UP!
Call: Rep Mark Green’s office 202-224-3121 (Capitol switchboard)
Speak to the staff of ranking committee chair, this gets your message to him directly…. otherwise, our voices are diluted 🇺🇸
STATEMENT from Ranking Member Bennie Thompson (D):
“After careful consideration, Committee Democrats have decided not to participate in the Republicans’ field hearing this week. Unfortunately, it has become clear that Republicans planned to politicize this event from the start, breaking with the Committee’s proud history of bipartisanship. Instead of a fact-finding mission to develop better border security and immigration policies, Republicans are traveling to the border to attack the Administration and try to score political points with their extreme rhetoric – despite having voted against the resources border personnel need. Committee Democrats are in regular contact with Department leadership and stakeholders on the ground and will be taking substantive site visits to the border – including as soon as this week.”
The Luge press’s is only too happy to run cover for the lies. Just a few days ago the Lying Press, Associated Press in this case, touted that the numbers of border crossers is down significantly, as if the announcements of the parole amnesty convinced millions of illegal aliens enroute through Central America or flying into Mexico from Africa, Asia, and South America to just return home and try and use the app to enter, rather than try their luck at the border. Actually, luck has nothing to do with it; coyotes who work for the cartels have guaranteed entry to the United States, no matter how many attempts it takes.
A sharp drop in illegal border crossings since December could blunt a Republican point of attack against President Joe Biden as the Democratic leader moves to reshape a broken asylum system that has dogged him and his predecessors.
A new poll by The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research shows some support for changing the number of immigrants and asylum-seekers allowed into the country. About 4 in 10 U.S. adults say the level of immigration and asylum-seekers should be lowered, while about 2 in 10 say they should be higher, according to the poll. About a third want the numbers to remain the same.
The decrease in border crossings followed Biden’s announcement in early January that Mexico would take back Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans under a pandemic-era rule that denies migrants the right to seek asylum as part of an effort to prevent the spread of COVID-19. At the same time, the U.S. agreed to admit up to 30,000 a month of those four nationalities on humanitarian parole if they apply online, enter at an airport and find a financial sponsor.
Instead, the reality is that the Fiscal Year 2023 is heading tobreak the record of illegal immigration from the last two fiscal years, when over 5 million illegal aliens entered or attempted to enter the United States, with most being released into the United States.
Migrant encounters at the southern border have already surpassed the one million mark for Fiscal Year 2023, multiple Customs and Border Protection (CBP) sources tell Fox News, marking an unprecedented pace for encounters.
As of Friday, the total migrant encounters at the border were at 1,008,217 for the fiscal year, which began in October. Of those, 87.8% were single adults. Just 328,454 were expelled under Title 42 — the pandemic-era protocol that allows border agents to rapidly expel border crossers.
There were more than 1.7 million encounters overall in FY 2021 and over 2.3 million in FY 2022. The first months of FY 2023 have outpaced those of the prior fiscal year. This time last year, numbers for FY22 through March 1 were 839,819—well under the 1 million mark.
Meanwhile, there have been 354,522 known “gotaways”—illegal immigrants who have evaded Border Patrol agents but have been detected on another form of surveillance. In FY 2022, there were nearly 600,000gotaways.
One may argue that the last few days have educated the illegal aliens and the numbers are dropping. But sadly for the Biden Regime and the Lying Press, reality has struck, and badly. Illegal aliens for whom the CBP One app is not available or not working have decided they are coming in, by hook or by crook, but mostly by violence. In fact, they are reverting to the common tactic that appeared during the early Clinton Regime, rushing the Ports-of-Entry (POE), the facilities where pedestrians and motor vehicles enter the United States from Mexico. Such tactics began in the 90s, but occasionally happened more recently as well under the Obama Regime and the Trump Administration.
Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1 . Policy. Advances in digital and distributed ledger technology for financial services have led to dramatic growth in markets for digital assets, with profound implications for the protection of consumers, investors, and businesses, including data privacy and security; financial stability and systemic risk; crime; national security; the ability to exercise human rights; financial inclusion and equity; and energy demand and climate change. In November 2021, non-state issued digital assets reached a combined market capitalization of $3 trillion, up from approximately $14 billion in early November 2016. Monetary authorities globally are also exploring, and in some cases introducing, central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).
While many activities involving digital assets are within the scope of existing domestic laws and regulations, an area where the United States has been a global leader, growing development and adoption of digital assets and related innovations, as well as inconsistent controls to defend against certain key risks, necessitate an evolution and alignment of the United States Government approach to digital assets. The United States has an interest in responsible financial innovation, expanding access to safe and affordable financial services, and reducing the cost of domestic and cross-border funds transfers and payments, including through the continued modernization of public payment systems. We must take strong steps to reduce the risks that digital assets could pose to consumers, investors, and business protections; financial stability and financial system integrity; combating and preventing crime and illicit finance; national security; the ability to exercise human rights; financial inclusion and equity; and climate change and pollution.
Sec. 2 . Objectives. The principal policy objectives of the United States with respect to digital assets are as follows:
(a) We must protect consumers, investors, and businesses in the United States. The unique and varied features of digital assets can pose significant financial risks to consumers, investors, and businesses if appropriate protections are not in place. In the absence of sufficient oversight and standards, firms providing digital asset services may provide inadequate protections for sensitive financial data, custodial and other arrangements relating to customer assets and funds, or disclosures of risks associated with investment. Cybersecurity and market failures at major digital asset exchanges and trading platforms have resulted in billions of dollars in losses. The United States should ensure that safeguards are in place and promote the responsible development of digital assets to protect consumers, investors, and businesses; maintain privacy; and shield against arbitrary or unlawful surveillance, which can contribute to human rights abuses.
(b) We must protect United States and global financial stability and mitigate systemic risk. Some digital asset trading platforms and service providers have grown rapidly in size and complexity and may not be subject to or in compliance with appropriate regulations or supervision. Digital asset issuers, exchanges and trading platforms, and intermediaries whose activities may increase risks to financial stability, should, as appropriate, be subject to and in compliance with regulatory and supervisory standards that govern traditional market infrastructures and financial firms, in line with the general Start Printed Page 14144 principle of “same business, same risks, same rules.” The new and unique uses and functions that digital assets can facilitate may create additional economic and financial risks requiring an evolution to a regulatory approach that adequately addresses those risks.
(c) We must mitigate the illicit finance and national security risks posed by misuse of digital assets. Digital assets may pose significant illicit finance risks, including money laundering, cybercrime and ransomware, narcotics and human trafficking, and terrorism and proliferation financing. Digital assets may also be used as a tool to circumvent United States and foreign financial sanctions regimes and other tools and authorities. Further, while the United States has been a leader in setting international standards for the regulation and supervision of digital assets for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), poor or nonexistent implementation of those standards in some jurisdictions abroad can present significant illicit financing risks for the United States and global financial systems. Illicit actors, including the perpetrators of ransomware incidents and other cybercrime, often launder and cash out of their illicit proceeds using digital asset service providers in jurisdictions that have not yet effectively implemented the international standards set by the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The continued availability of service providers in jurisdictions where international AML/CFT standards are not effectively implemented enables financial activity without illicit finance controls. Growth in decentralized financial ecosystems, peer-to-peer payment activity, and obscured blockchain ledgers without controls to mitigate illicit finance could also present additional market and national security risks in the future. The United States must ensure appropriate controls and accountability for current and future digital assets systems to promote high standards for transparency, privacy, and security—including through regulatory, governance, and technological measures—that counter illicit activities and preserve or enhance the efficacy of our national security tools. When digital assets are abused or used in illicit ways, or undermine national security, it is in the national interest to take actions to mitigate these illicit finance and national security risks through regulation, oversight, law enforcement action, or use of other United States Government authorities.
(d) We must reinforce United States leadership in the global financial system and in technological and economic competitiveness, including through the responsible development of payment innovations and digital assets. The United States has an interest in ensuring that it remains at the forefront of responsible development and design of digital assets and the technology that underpins new forms of payments and capital flows in the international financial system, particularly in setting standards that promote: democratic values; the rule of law; privacy; the protection of consumers, investors, and businesses; and interoperability with digital platforms, legacy architecture, and international payment systems. The United States derives significant economic and national security benefits from the central role that the United States dollar and United States financial institutions and markets play in the global financial system. Continued United States leadership in the global financial system will sustain United States financial power and promote United States economic interests.
(e) We must promote access to safe and affordable financial services. Many Americans are underbanked and the costs of cross-border money transfers and payments are high. The United States has a strong interest in promoting responsible innovation that expands equitable access to financial services, particularly for those Americans underserved by the traditional banking system, including by making investments and domestic and cross-border funds transfers and payments cheaper, faster, and safer, and by promoting greater and more cost-efficient access to financial products and services. The United States also has an interest in ensuring that the benefits of financial innovation are enjoyed equitably by all Americans and that any disparate impacts of financial innovation are mitigated. Start Printed Page 14145
(f) We must support technological advances that promote responsible development and use of digital assets. The technological architecture of different digital assets has substantial implications for privacy, national security, the operational security and resilience of financial systems, climate change, the ability to exercise human rights, and other national goals. The United States has an interest in ensuring that digital asset technologies and the digital payments ecosystem are developed, designed, and implemented in a responsible manner that includes privacy and security in their architecture, integrates features and controls that defend against illicit exploitation, and reduces negative climate impacts and environmental pollution, as may result from some cryptocurrency mining.
Sec. 3 . Coordination. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (APEP) shall coordinate, through the interagency process described in National Security Memorandum 2 of February 4, 2021 (Renewing the National Security Council System), the executive branch actions necessary to implement this order. The interagency process shall include, as appropriate: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Domestic Policy Council, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development. Representatives of other executive departments and agencies (agencies) and other senior officials may be invited to attend interagency meetings as appropriate, including, with due respect for their regulatory independence, representatives of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and other Federal regulatory agencies.
Sec. 4 . Policy and Actions Related to United States Central Bank Digital Currencies. (a) The policy of my Administration on a United States CBDC is as follows:
(i) Sovereign money is at the core of a well-functioning financial system, macroeconomic stabilization policies, and economic growth. My Administration places the highest urgency on research and development efforts into the potential design and deployment options of a United States CBDC. These efforts should include assessments of possible benefits and risks for consumers, investors, and businesses; financial stability and systemic risk; payment systems; national security; the ability to exercise human rights; financial inclusion and equity; and the actions required to launch a United States CBDC if doing so is deemed to be in the national interest.
(ii) My Administration sees merit in showcasing United States leadership and participation in international fora related to CBDCs and in multi-country conversations and pilot projects involving CBDCs. Any future dollar payment system should be designed in a way that is consistent with United States priorities (as outlined in section 4(a)(i) of this order) and democratic values, including privacy protections, and that ensures the global financial system has appropriate transparency, connectivity, and platform and architecture interoperability or transferability, as appropriate.
(iii) A United States CBDC may have the potential to support efficient and low-cost transactions, particularly for cross-border funds transfers and payments, and to foster greater access to the financial system, with fewer of the risks posed by private sector-administered digital assets. A United States CBDC that is interoperable with CBDCs issued by other monetary Start Printed Page 14146 authorities could facilitate faster and lower-cost cross-border payments and potentially boost economic growth, support the continued centrality of the United States within the international financial system, and help to protect the unique role that the dollar plays in global finance. There are also, however, potential risks and downsides to consider. We should prioritize timely assessments of potential benefits and risks under various designs to ensure that the United States remains a leader in the international financial system.
(b) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit to the President a report on the future of money and payment systems, including the conditions that drive broad adoption of digital assets; the extent to which technological innovation may influence these outcomes; and the implications for the United States financial system, the modernization of and changes to payment systems, economic growth, financial inclusion, and national security. This report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. Based on the potential United States CBDC design options, this report shall include an analysis of:
(i) the potential implications of a United States CBDC, based on the possible design choices, for national interests, including implications for economic growth and stability;
(ii) the potential implications a United States CBDC might have on financial inclusion;
(iii) the potential relationship between a CBDC and private sector-administered digital assets;
(iv) the future of sovereign and privately produced money globally and implications for our financial system and democracy;
(v) the extent to which foreign CBDCs could displace existing currencies and alter the payment system in ways that could undermine United States financial centrality;
(vi) the potential implications for national security and financial crime, including an analysis of illicit financing risks, sanctions risks, other law enforcement and national security interests, and implications for human rights; and
(vii) an assessment of the effects that the growth of foreign CBDCs may have on United States interests generally.
(c) The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Chairman of the Federal Reserve) is encouraged to continue to research and report on the extent to which CBDCs could improve the efficiency and reduce the costs of existing and future payments systems, to continue to assess the optimal form of a United States CBDC, and to develop a strategic plan for Federal Reserve and broader United States Government action, as appropriate, that evaluates the necessary steps and requirements for the potential implementation and launch of a United States CBDC. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve is also encouraged to evaluate the extent to which a United States CBDC, based on the potential design options, could enhance or impede the ability of monetary policy to function effectively as a critical macroeconomic stabilization tool.
(d) The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, shall:
(i) within 180 days of the date of this order, provide to the President through the APNSA and APEP an assessment of whether legislative changes would be necessary to issue a United States CBDC, should it be deemed appropriate and in the national interest; and Start Printed Page 14147
(ii) within 210 days of the date of this order, provide to the President through the APNSA and the APEP a corresponding legislative proposal, based on consideration of the report submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury under section 4(b) of this order and any materials developed by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve consistent with section 4(c) of this order.
Sec. 5 . Measures to Protect Consumers, Investors, and Businesses. (a) The increased use of digital assets and digital asset exchanges and trading platforms may increase the risks of crimes such as fraud and theft, other statutory and regulatory violations, privacy and data breaches, unfair and abusive acts or practices, and other cyber incidents faced by consumers, investors, and businesses. The rise in use of digital assets, and differences across communities, may also present disparate financial risk to less informed market participants or exacerbate inequities. It is critical to ensure that digital assets do not pose undue risks to consumers, investors, or businesses, and to put in place protections as a part of efforts to expand access to safe and affordable financial services.
(b) Consistent with the goals stated in section 5(a) of this order:
(i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor and the heads of other relevant agencies, including, as appropriate, the heads of independent regulatory agencies such as the FTC, the SEC, the CFTC, Federal banking agencies, and the CFPB, shall submit to the President a report, or section of the report required by section 4 of this order, on the implications of developments and adoption of digital assets and changes in financial market and payment system infrastructures for United States consumers, investors, businesses, and for equitable economic growth. One section of the report shall address the conditions that would drive mass adoption of different types of digital assets and the risks and opportunities such growth might present to United States consumers, investors, and businesses, including a focus on how technological innovation may impact these efforts and with an eye toward those most vulnerable to disparate impacts. The report shall also include policy recommendations, including potential regulatory and legislative actions, as appropriate, to protect United States consumers, investors, and businesses, and support expanding access to safe and affordable financial services. The report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(ii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Chief Technology Officer of the United States, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit to the President a technical evaluation of the technological infrastructure, capacity, and expertise that would be necessary at relevant agencies to facilitate and support the introduction of a CBDC system should one be proposed. The evaluation should specifically address the technical risks of the various designs, including with respect to emerging and future technological developments, such as quantum computing. The evaluation should also include any reflections or recommendations on how the inclusion of digital assets in Federal processes may affect the work of the United States Government and the provision of Government services, including risks and benefits to cybersecurity, customer experience, and social-safety-net programs. The evaluation shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(iii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the President a report on the role of law enforcement agencies in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting criminal activity related to digital assets. The report shall include any recommendations on regulatory or legislative actions, as appropriate. Start Printed Page 14148
(iv) The Attorney General, the Chair of the FTC, and the Director of the CFPB are each encouraged to consider what, if any, effects the growth of digital assets could have on competition policy.
(v) The Chair of the FTC and the Director of the CFPB are each encouraged to consider the extent to which privacy or consumer protection measures within their respective jurisdictions may be used to protect users of digital assets and whether additional measures may be needed.
(vi) The Chair of the SEC, the Chairman of the CFTC, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency are each encouraged to consider the extent to which investor and market protection measures within their respective jurisdictions may be used to address the risks of digital assets and whether additional measures may be needed.
(vii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Assistant to the President and National Climate Advisor, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit a report to the President on the connections between distributed ledger technology and short-, medium-, and long-term economic and energy transitions; the potential for these technologies to impede or advance efforts to tackle climate change at home and abroad; and the impacts these technologies have on the environment. This report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. The report should also address the effect of cryptocurrencies’ consensus mechanisms on energy usage, including research into potential mitigating measures and alternative mechanisms of consensus and the design tradeoffs those may entail. The report should specifically address:
(A) potential uses of blockchain that could support monitoring or mitigating technologies to climate impacts, such as exchanging of liabilities for greenhouse gas emissions, water, and other natural or environmental assets; and
(B) implications for energy policy, including as it relates to grid management and reliability, energy efficiency incentives and standards, and sources of energy supply.
(viii) Within 1 year of submission of the report described in section 5(b)(vii) of this order, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall update the report described in section 5(b)(vii) of this order, including to address any knowledge gaps identified in such report.
Sec. 6 . Actions to Promote Financial Stability, Mitigate Systemic Risk, and Strengthen Market Integrity. (a) Financial regulators—including the SEC, the CFTC, and the CFPB and Federal banking agencies—play critical roles in establishing and overseeing protections across the financial system that safeguard its integrity and promote its stability. Since 2017, the Secretary of the Treasury has convened the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to assess the financial stability risks and regulatory gaps posed by the ongoing adoption of digital assets. The United States must assess and take steps to address risks that digital assets pose to financial stability and financial market integrity.
(b) Within 210 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury should convene the FSOC and produce a report outlining the specific financial stability risks and regulatory gaps posed by various types of digital assets and providing recommendations to address such risks. As the Secretary Start Printed Page 14149 of the Treasury and the FSOC deem appropriate, the report should consider the particular features of various types of digital assets and include recommendations that address the identified financial stability risks posed by these digital assets, including any proposals for additional or adjusted regulation and supervision as well as for new legislation. The report should take account of the prior analyses and assessments of the FSOC, agencies, and the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, including the ongoing work of the Federal banking agencies, as appropriate.
Sec. 7 . Actions to Limit Illicit Finance and Associated National Security Risks. (a) Digital assets have facilitated sophisticated cybercrime-related financial networks and activity, including through ransomware activity. The growing use of digital assets in financial activity heightens risks of crimes such as money laundering, terrorist and proliferation financing, fraud and theft schemes, and corruption. These illicit activities highlight the need for ongoing scrutiny of the use of digital assets, the extent to which technological innovation may impact such activities, and exploration of opportunities to mitigate these risks through regulation, supervision, public-private engagement, oversight, and law enforcement.
(b) Within 90 days of submission to the Congress of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies may each submit to the President supplemental annexes, which may be classified or unclassified, to the Strategy offering additional views on illicit finance risks posed by digital assets, including cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, CBDCs, and trends in the use of digital assets by illicit actors.
(c) Within 120 days of submission to the Congress of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies shall develop a coordinated action plan based on the Strategy’s conclusions for mitigating the digital-asset-related illicit finance and national security risks addressed in the updated strategy. This action plan shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. The action plan shall address the role of law enforcement and measures to increase financial services providers’ compliance with AML/CFT obligations related to digital asset activities.
(d) Within 120 days following completion of all of the following reports—the National Money Laundering Risk Assessment; the National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment; the National Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment; and the updated National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing—the Secretary of the Treasury shall notify the relevant agencies through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order on any pending, proposed, or prospective rulemakings to address digital asset illicit finance risks. The Secretary of the Treasury shall consult with and consider the perspectives of relevant agencies in evaluating opportunities to mitigate such risks through regulation.
Sec. 8 . Policy and Actions Related to Fostering International Cooperation and United States Competitiveness. (a) The policy of my Administration on fostering international cooperation and United States competitiveness with respect to digital assets and financial innovation is as follows:
(i) Technology-driven financial innovation is frequently cross-border and therefore requires international cooperation among public authorities. This cooperation is critical to maintaining high regulatory standards and a level playing field. Uneven regulation, supervision, and compliance across jurisdictions creates opportunities for arbitrage and raises risks to financial Start Printed Page 14150 stability and the protection of consumers, investors, businesses, and markets. Inadequate AML/CFT regulation, supervision, and enforcement by other countries challenges the ability of the United States to investigate illicit digital asset transaction flows that frequently jump overseas, as is often the case in ransomware payments and other cybercrime-related money laundering. There must also be cooperation to reduce inefficiencies in international funds transfer and payment systems.
(ii) The United States Government has been active in international fora and through bilateral partnerships on many of these issues and has a robust agenda to continue this work in the coming years. While the United States held the position of President of the FATF, the United States led the group in developing and adopting the first international standards on digital assets. The United States must continue to work with international partners on standards for the development and appropriate interoperability of digital payment architectures and CBDCs to reduce payment inefficiencies and ensure that any new funds transfer and payment systems are consistent with United States values and legal requirements.
(iii) While the United States held the position of President of the 2020 G7, the United States established the G7 Digital Payments Experts Group to discuss CBDCs, stablecoins, and other digital payment issues. The G7 report outlining a set of policy principles for CBDCs is an important contribution to establishing guidelines for jurisdictions for the exploration and potential development of CBDCs. While a CBDC would be issued by a country’s central bank, the supporting infrastructure could involve both public and private participants. The G7 report highlighted that any CBDC should be grounded in the G7’s long-standing public commitments to transparency, the rule of law, and sound economic governance, as well as the promotion of competition and innovation.
(iv) The United States continues to support the G20 roadmap for addressing challenges and frictions with cross-border funds transfers and payments for which work is underway, including work on improvements to existing systems for cross-border funds transfers and payments, the international dimensions of CBDC designs, and the potential of well-regulated stablecoin arrangements. The international Financial Stability Board (FSB), together with standard-setting bodies, is leading work on issues related to stablecoins, cross-border funds transfers and payments, and other international dimensions of digital assets and payments, while FATF continues its leadership in setting AML/CFT standards for digital assets. Such international work should continue to address the full spectrum of issues and challenges raised by digital assets, including financial stability, consumer, investor, and business risks, and money laundering, terrorist financing, proliferation financing, sanctions evasion, and other illicit activities.
(v) My Administration will elevate the importance of these topics and expand engagement with our critical international partners, including through fora such as the G7, G20, FATF, and FSB. My Administration will support the ongoing international work and, where appropriate, push for additional work to drive development and implementation of holistic standards, cooperation and coordination, and information sharing. With respect to digital assets, my Administration will seek to ensure that our core democratic values are respected; consumers, investors, and businesses are protected; appropriate global financial system connectivity and platform and architecture interoperability are preserved; and the safety and soundness of the global financial system and international monetary system are maintained.
(b) In furtherance of the policy stated in section 8(a) of this order:
(i) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall establish a framework for interagency international engagement with foreign counterparts and Start Printed Page 14151 in international fora to, as appropriate, adapt, update, and enhance adoption of global principles and standards for how digital assets are used and transacted, and to promote development of digital asset and CBDC technologies consistent with our values and legal requirements. This framework shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order. This framework shall include specific and prioritized lines of effort and coordinated messaging; interagency engagement and activities with foreign partners, such as foreign assistance and capacity-building efforts and coordination of global compliance; and whole-of-government efforts to promote international principles, standards, and best practices. This framework should reflect ongoing leadership by the Secretary of the Treasury and financial regulators in relevant international financial standards bodies, and should elevate United States engagement on digital assets issues in technical standards bodies and other international fora to promote development of digital asset and CBDC technologies consistent with our values.
(ii) Within 1 year of the date of the establishment of the framework required by section 8(b)(i) of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other relevant agencies as appropriate, shall submit a report to the President on priority actions taken under the framework and its effectiveness. This report shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(iii) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall establish a framework for enhancing United States economic competitiveness in, and leveraging of, digital asset technologies. This framework shall be coordinated through the interagency process described in section 3 of this order.
(iv) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit a report to the President on how to strengthen international law enforcement cooperation for detecting, investigating, and prosecuting criminal activity related to digital assets.
Sec. 9 . Definitions. For the purposes of this order:
(a) The term “blockchain” refers to distributed ledger technologies where data is shared across a network that creates a digital ledger of verified transactions or information among network participants and the data are typically linked using cryptography to maintain the integrity of the ledger and execute other functions, including transfer of ownership or value.
(b) The term “central bank digital currency” or “CBDC” refers to a form of digital money or monetary value, denominated in the national unit of account, that is a direct liability of the central bank.
(c) The term “cryptocurrencies” refers to a digital asset, which may be a medium of exchange, for which generation or ownership records are supported through a distributed ledger technology that relies on cryptography, such as a blockchain.
(d) The term “digital assets” refers to all CBDCs, regardless of the technology used, and to other representations of value, financial assets and instruments, or claims that are used to make payments or investments, or to transmit or exchange funds or the equivalent thereof, that are issued or represented in digital form through the use of distributed ledger technology. For example, digital assets include cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and CBDCs. Regardless of the label used, a digital asset may be, among other things, a security, a commodity, a derivative, or other financial product. Start Printed Page 14152 Digital assets may be exchanged across digital asset trading platforms, including centralized and decentralized finance platforms, or through peer-to-peer technologies.
(e) The term “stablecoins” refers to a category of cryptocurrencies with mechanisms that are aimed at maintaining a stable value, such as by pegging the value of the coin to a specific currency, asset, or pool of assets or by algorithmically controlling supply in response to changes in demand in order to stabilize value.
Sec. 10 . General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
THE WHITE HOUSE, March 9, 2022. Filed 3-11-22; 8:45 am]
Judicial Watch: Biden National Archives Withholds 1,500 Pages of Records about Trump Raid – Hides 99% of Records
(Washington, DC) – Judicial Watch announced today that the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) is releasing only 65 pages out of over 1,600 pages of records related to the Biden administration’s unprecedented raid on the home of former President Trump.
The records are being sought under August 2022 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia after the National Archives and Records Administration failed to respond adequately to a February 2022 FOIA request (Judicial Watch v National Archives and Records Administration (No. 1:22-cv-02535). Judicial Watch asks for:
All records regarding the referral from NARA to the Department of Justice regarding the records management procedures of former President Donald Trump (https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/national-archives-asks-doj-investigate-trumps-handling-white/story?id=82781128 ). This request includes all related records of communication between any official or employee of NARA and any official or employee of the Department of Justice and/or any other branch, department, agency, or office of the federal government.
All records regarding the retrieval of records from President Trump or any individual or entity acting on his behalf by the National Archives and Records Administration. This request includes related records of communication between any official or employee of NARA and President Trump and/or any individual or entity acting on his behalf.
On October 3 the Archives released documents for only two categories of records: 1.) all emails between NARA officials and representatives of former President Trump and 2.) NARA emails to external entities other than Trump representatives related to the 15 boxes as of March 31, 2022.
The Archives recently sent Judicial Watch two letters in which it stated it found 309 pages relating to Category 1 but was releasing only 11 pages, less than one percent, nine pages in full and 2 in part.
The Archives wrote it found 1,303 pages of emails in Category 2 but was releasing only 54 of those pages, 39 in full, 15 with redactions. Again, less than one percent of the records.
The National Archives released a few pages of correspondence with Congress and an email with former President Trump’s representatives in which the Archives asserted alleged authority over records in Trump’s personal possession.
NARA referred to numerous FOIA exemptions as the reasons for its withholdings:
Exemption (b)(5) was asserted to protect NARA’s deliberations with Trump’s representatives, Congress, and other federal agencies.
Exemption (b)(6) was asserted to protect personal privacy.
Exemption (b)(7)(A) was asserted to withhold records compiled for law enforcement purposes.
Exemption (b)(7)(C) was asserted to withhold records compiled for law enforcement purposes, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
Exemption (b)(7)(E) was asserted to protect law enforcement information related to techniques and procedures that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.
“The Biden administration is in cover-up mode on its abusive and unprecedented raid of former President Trump’s home,” stated Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton. “The National Archives pretends to be concerned to public access to public information while unlawfully ignoring FOIA law and using a myriad of excuses to hide records about its manufactured dispute over the Trump records.”
Judicial Watch is in the forefront in the court battle for transparency regarding the abusive Biden raid on Trump’s home.
In August, Judicial Watch forced the release of the raid affidavit through its court request to unseal the warrant materials used in the unprecedented raid on the home of former President Trump.
Judicial Watch also just filed two lawsuits against the Justice Department and DOJ and FBI for records of the Mar-a-Lago raid search warrant application and approval, as well as communications about the warrant between the FBI, Executive Office of the President and the Secret Service.
Suspected Terrorists Who Crossed Border Into United States May Have Been Released: Mayorkas
Some of the 42 illegal immigrants who were arrested by U.S. border agents and identified as suspected terrorists may have been released into the United States, Homeland Security Secretary Alejandryo Mayorkas said on May 4.
“Some may be placed in removal proceedings. Some may be placed in criminal custody. Some may be cooperating with law enforcement. Some may be downgraded from the terrorist rating,” Mayorkas told the Senate Homeland & Governmental Affairs Committee in Washington.
Mayorkas said officials in his agency know the “precise disposition” of each of the 42 suspected terrorists but declined to share that information in a public setting.
Instead, he offered to give a classified briefing to Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio), who had been questioning him.
“I look forward to getting that information,” Portman said.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently revealed that 42 people on the terror watchlist “attempted to enter the United States illegally” and were arrested by border agents between Jan. 20, 2021 and March 2022. The watchlist is maintained by the FBI, which says people on it are “reasonably suspected to be involved in terrorism (or related activities).”
In his opening statement, Portman, the ranking member of the Senate panel, described himself as shocked when he learned about the number of suspected terrorists apprehended.
Other Republicans during the hearing on Wednesday also touched on the issue.
The 42 “are the ones we know you caught; we don’t know how many you didn’t,” Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) told Mayorkas.
Sen. Gary Peters (D-Mich.), the panel’s chairman, took a different angle regarding the watchlist.
Peters said Arab-Americans, including those in the state he represents, have “long endured lengthy and intrusive screening when traveling” and noted that Biden while campaigning in 2020 promised to order DHS to review how people are placed on the watchlist and the no-fly list to make sure that the processes “do not have an adverse impact on individuals or groups based on national origin, race, religion or ethnicity” and to “improve the process to remove names, when justified, from these lists.”
“Can you provide an update on the progress of your review and when you expect changes to be implemented?” Peters asked.
Mayorkas said the work is underway but that he could not provide any further information at this time.
Thanks to Joe, Ukrainian Pipelines Are Putin Pipelines
A batch of recently uncovered Hunter Biden Laptop emails reveal members of Hunter’s D.C.-based government relations crew lobbied “green” Democratic senators into teaming up with Joe Biden in 2014 on Ukrainian energy security efforts for a course of action that eight years later has become catastrophic.
The ghastly truth being: Thanks to “green” Dems and Joe/“Robin,” our tax dollars refurbished the pipelines that are now powering Putin’s horrific invasion of Ukraine.
Here’s a screenshot of an email I discovered as I cross-referenced Joe Biden’s Ukraine visit to Kyiv on November 20-21, 2014, with email traffic on the Hunter Biden laptop. My copy of the laptop, given to me last fall by Garrett Ziegler on behalf of Marco Polo USA, is identical to the laptop version thoroughly exposed by The New York Post, but only recently acknowledged as authentic by the New York Times and the Washington Post.
This July 11th, 2014, email from Hunter’s Boies Schiller Flexner lawyer Heather King to Burisma executive Vadym Pozharskyi outlines her efforts — partnered with Hunter associate David Leiter — to set Pozharskyi up in a series of meetings with U.S. government agencies, industry groups, congressional staffers and notably Democratic Senators Edward Markey, of Massachusetts, and Chris Murphy, of Connecticut.
And while subsequent emails indicate Pozharskyi traveled to Washington, D.C., in July 2014 and again in September 2014, it’s unclear if he met with any or all of the people King has listed. Though soon after his September trip, he heralded Burisma’s windfall in the USAID Municipal Energy Reform (MERP) Project, which I detail in this archived Substack:
And it’s important to note here that none of the actions Leiter or King have taken to this point are illegal, unless — and it’s a big unless — they have knowledge of Joe Biden coordinating with Hunter or Burisma to cut himself in on the deal.
But as I’ve written about previously, there is Laptop email evidence that Joe was directly involved with Pozharskyi as of November 2014. And it’s my belief both Leiter and King will need to answer questions about that as they were copied on that email.
So, Dave and Heather, who was Robin?
These meetings and other efforts by Hunter’s Burisma crew were meant to capitalize on Joe’s public assignment of promoting Ukrainian energy security. But my discovery of a November 13, 2014, Pozharskyi email invoking Joe Biden’s code name “Robin,” which I discussed in the following archived Substack, indicates to me Joe was privately working for Burisma:
Then as a bonus, Joe/Robin pitched in to help his “green” Senate buddies prioritize Ukrainian natural gas infrastructure rather than U.S. liquified natural gas (LNG) exports to Europe, thus achieving their objective of undermining America’s shale fracking boom.
A June 27, 2014 email from lawyer King reveals Hunter’s Burisma team’s intentions to coattail with Joe’s Senate pals.
And here’s a screenshot of the letter she references, which Burisma then published on its website. The “greens,” led by Markey, included Senators Jean Shaheen, of New Hampshire; Ron Wyden, of Oregon; and Chris Murphy, of Connecticut.
Note the mention of Joe’s mission and the discussion of Ukraine’s “shale gas resources,” which subtly ties Burisma into the effort because it is one of the few Ukrainian energy companies with expertise fracking shale gas. So Joe Biden or any Democrat official mentioning Ukraine’s “unconventional gas reserves” or “shale gas resources” after 2014 indicates to me, they are referring to resources under development by Burisma.
After Burisma published the Obama letter on their website, journalist Michael Scherer examined lobbying disclosures by David Leiter and wrote about Burisma’s government outreach in Time Magazine. So yes, legacy media did question — ever so briefly — the red flag warning of Hunter’s Burisma board appointment.
And I’ll add that Jay Carney, who was then Obama’s White House press secretary, was previously a Time Magazine correspondent, with a stint as their bureau chief in Moscow. Not sure if he spoke with Michael Scherer about this story, but there’s certainly a familiarity there.
Scherer intelligently raises Leiter’s lobbying role but leaves out the money involved. According to OpenSecrets.org, Markey received $10,000 in donations for his 2014 “work” with David Leiter, while Shaheen got $3,800. Leiter also gave the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee $10,000.
And what did Burisma get for its money? Or more importantly, it’s undisclosed relationship with Joe/Robin.
Well, as I wrote about in my last Substack, and this July 31, 2014, email proves, Hunter’s crew, with help from Amos Hochstein, a State Department energy expert, who worked closely with Joe, delivered the dollars. Burisma got a chunk of money from USAID’s Municipal Energy Relief Program (MERP.) And recall that award came just weeks before Joe Biden’s November 2014 trip to Kyiv.
But that was just the start.
The Ukraine Freedom Support Act
In a previous Substack I wrote that Joe either through his staffers or his own efforts, as in his work with his Senate colleagues demonstrates, landed three big windfalls for Burisma. The first was the MERP award.
The second was the December 2014 Ukraine Freedom Support Act (UFSA,) championed by Senator Markey.
Passed into law weeks after Joe’s November 2014 visit to Kyiv, the UFSA, amongst other provisions, directed 50 million U.S. taxpayer dollars be spent on Ukrainian energy security. And while a good chunk of that money benefited Burisma, even more significantly, portions of those funds paid for construction and repairs of the very same natural gas pipelines Vladimir Putin has now leveraged against Europe during his brutal invasion of Ukraine.
Here’s a screenshot of the portion of the law pertaining to natural gas pipelines. And note the date, December 18, 2014. This is shortly before those Democratic senators headed home for winter recess. And when they returned they were no longer in control of the Senate, as the Republicans had won the majority of seats in the 2014 midterms. So at this point of the legislative calendar, this was a congressional going-out-the-door giveaway to their donors. With Joe and the “greens” on their team, no wonder Burisma scored big.
And here’s the link to the Obama White House press release heralding then Vice President Joe Biden’s November 2014 accomplishments after his visit to Kyiv:
And here’s a screenshot of the information pertaining to the Burisma payoff. The “introduction of new technologies” refers to fracking, which means Burisma.
According to the Congressional Research Service, at the time, about 40 percent of Russia’s natural gas exports to Europe flowed through Ukrainian pipelines, an arrangement for which they paid transit fees. Ukraine also imported a substantial amount of their energy from Russia. So the USFA funds for natural gas pipeline construction and maintenance were as beneficial to Putin as they were to Ukraine.
Even in 2014, as Putin was occupying Crimea and supporting separatists in the Donbas, he was also paying Ukraine to use its pipelines to transit his Russian natural gas and oil to Europe. Then in June 2014 Putin halted all exports of natural gas to Ukraine to harm their economy, although he simultaneously continued paying them allow his gas through their pipelines to Europe. Which they did.
And still do.
So no matter how the world sees this horrific war in Ukraine, the one constant is the pipelines. These are the same pipelines that, in spite all the grisly, muddy death, remain undisturbed. Tanks, artillery, missiles — Russian and Ukrainian— nothing touches the pipelines. Russian gas flows through them to Europe without interruption while Europe holds its collective breath and prays Putin keeps their gas flowing.
It was Joe Biden and his Democratic Party’s hostility towards the American energy sector led to this international tragedy. And now he and his European allies are begging for U.S. shale gas producers for LNG exports to undo the economic damage.
Keep begging, Joe. It’s going to take a while.
Another way to put it is: Joe Biden, the man who gave billions of dollars worth of our military materiel to the Taliban, also gave millions of our tax dollars to Ukraine to build pipelines … probably for Vladimir Putin’s Russian natural gas industry.
President Trump said it best, “Joe Biden has played right into Vladimir Putin’s hands.”
Biden’s DHS Confirms Plans to Siphon Healthcare Services Away from Veterans to Illegal Aliens at Border
This is lower than low. Just look at the smug look on that scumbag’s face. He needs to locked up NOW!!
President Joe Biden’s Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has seemingly confirmed plans to siphon healthcare services away from American veterans treated at Veterans Affairs (VA) to illegal aliens arriving at the United States-Mexico border.
During a hearing before the House Homeland Security Committee on Wednesday, DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas confirmed to Rep. Ashley Hinson (R-IA) that the Biden administration is in talks with VA officials to potentially transfer doctors and nurses to the southern border to treat illegal aliens arriving every day in record-breaking numbers.
“Is the department planning to reallocate resources, doctors and nurses, from our VA system intended to care for our veterans to illegal immigrants at our southern border?” Hinson asked.
Mayorkas responded, stating that “the resources that the medical personnel from the Veterans Administration would allocate to this effort is under the judgment of the secretary of Veterans Affairs, who prioritizes the interests of veterans above all others for very noble and correct.”
When Hinson asked if Mayorkas had any conversations about the plan, he responded, “I have not personally, but of course, our teams, our personnel have. and I’d be very pleased to follow up with you.”
The remarks come as Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO) had sought clarification on reports that the Biden administration was looking to siphon doctors and nurses away from the VA toward illegal aliens at the border.
“In the words of one [Customs and Border Protection] official, ‘We’re going to take medical services away from people that really deserve that, who went to combat … to give free medical attention to illegal migrants,’” Hawley wrote in a letter to Mayorkas.
Already, Americans are forced to subsidize medical care for illegal aliens to the tune of $18.5 billion annually. Last year alone, Americans footed the bill for more than $316 million in medical care for border crossers and illegal aliens who were detained in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody.
John Binder is a reporter for Breitbart News.
Email him at email@example.com. Follow him on Twitter here.